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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how implied cost of equity from fundamental valuations 
affect optimal allocation for a marginal investor, net of costs. We find Black-
Litterman long-only restricted portfolio incorporating implied cost of equity 
outperform peer-group benchmark by 0.22 larger monthly information ratio. 
Moreover, a non-short restricted portfolio constructed on implied earnings 
yield outperform peer-group index by 0.12 larger monthly information ratio. 
Simple historic allocation models with and without covariance shrinkage 
perform poorly and get outperformed by peer-index in the non-short restricted 
case by 0.10 and 0.64 larger monthly information ratio, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
In late June 2014, the oil price began decreasing from USD120. After the Saudi-led change in 
OPEC`s strategy to defend market share regardless of price in November, the oil price 
plummeted to below USD50. Stock prices in oil and oil-related companies followed, reaching 
decade-low levels during the summer of 2015. Under Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky’s 
(1972) definition of financial crisis, the recent oil-price drop is within scope and the lemons 
problem (Akerlof, 1970) may arise as a result. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) explain how investors are unable to distinguish between good and 
bad equity issuers and they show that the price they will pay for shares will reflect the average 
quality of the issuers. The result is high-quality firms receive a lower price for their shares 
compared to their fair market value, while low-quality firms receive a price above their fair 
market value. Under such conditions, Black & Litterman (1990) introduced a quantitative 
model where practitioners can actively lay abnormal returns and blend it with CAPM 
equilibrium returns on a sample of stocks in an efficient way. In the wake of this, several 
predominant academics, including Meucci (2006), have developed extensions.  
We produce long and short tangency portfolios for a marginal investor in the Black-
Litterman framework, with the implied cost of equity derived from in-debt analysis of five 
sub-sectors, and extensive excel valuation models of 19 companies. We use PESTEL to 
evaluate the external factors affecting the environment in the sub-sectors and Porter in order 
to determine the competition and thus the operational margins. On the basis of this, we use a 
combination of VRIN and financial analysis to value each stock. As for the models, we also 
apply an inverse P/E model to duplicate the average expectations of the market participants 
and an Historic model with Single-Index Covariance to smooth the parametric estimation of 
covariance. In addition, we apply pure historic data to represent “least effort” way of designing 
the portfolios on the same equities. The performance is measured in a one-period framework 
against several benchmark portfolios and we apply trading- and lending costs to make 
comparison across portfolios and benchmarks meaningful. The market is represented by 
OSEBX. In addition, we use the Energy Index (OSLENX) to measure peer group performance. 
Moreover, we use Markowitz optimization for the main result. Lastly, we extend our thesis 
with Meucci’s Copula-Opinion Pooling for non-normal returns, which is used in a CVaR 
optimizer accounting for asymmetries.  
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We find the Sharpe Ratio of OSEBX and OSLENX superior to the constructed 
portfolios. The reason for a high Sharpe ratio is the market capitalization size of Statoil in 
OSEBX, and in the energy index. The corresponding large monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.26 of 
Statoil thus explains the performance. Both the Black-Litterman and the inverse P/E or 
earnings yield model are superior to OSLENX on the information ratio criteria for both long 
and short strategies. 
Black-Litterman’s long portfolio produces the overall highest monthly information 
ratio of 0.23 regardless of short-restrictions in the optimization. According to Treynor and 
Black (1973), alpha bets add risk-adjusted value to an efficient portfolio as they open for 
equilibrium breach to some stocks in the investment universe. This supports the value of 
information and quantitatively model exercise of the Black-Litterman framework. The 
posterior portfolio contains a blend of the prior equilibrium returns and the implied cost of 
equity dictated by Bayesian Statistics. The results emphasize the information value of our 
valuations as the posterior Black-Litterman portfolio outperforms the prior portfolio. 
The results are also evidential for good performance of the implied market 
expectations, as the short inverse P/E portfolio bear second highest monthly information ratio 
of 0.13. A high positive allocation to Farstad, which is a high-performer in the out-of-sample 
period, drives the information ratio. Extreme portfolio weights under this target allocation 
make the results highly sensitive. Nevertheless, the market implied expectations beat the 
simplest models, Historic and the Single-Index model.  
We find the performance of the simplest historic models to be poor with information 
ratios and Sharpe ratios, which are low in comparison with the other models. Our findings is 
supported by Levy and Roll`s (2008) paper on historic optimal Mean-Variance portfolio 
weights. According to the paper, historic mean-variance portfolio weights are not satisfying 
guidance for future optimal weights as the noise factor in historic returns control the resulting 
portfolio weights.   
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce 
the most important concepts of theory. In the proceeding, we present the chosen equities and 
examine the data basis. In section 4, we conduct strategic analyses and valuations on the 
equities, which is preliminary for the portfolio construction presented in section 5. Lastly, in 
Extensions in section 6, we apply portfolio allocation in a CVaR-framework.  
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2. Data  
The selection of equities for the active portfolio in oil-related sub-sectors was carried out 
screening first on size in order to reduce noise and then on turnover volumes to mitigate 
liquidity issues. Finally, we screen on available consensus estimates in order to estimate 
inverse P/E.  
Relevant data for portfolio modeling are monthly prices, adjusted for reverse splits, 
splits and dividends. Moreover, we have set the investment horizon to ensure statistical 
inference, as some of the companies have limited time on the stock exchange, which gave us 
80 data points in the period 01.02.2009-01.09.2015 (6.67 years). The Oslo Børs Benchmark 
Index (“OSEBX”) and Oslo Børs Energy Index (“OSELNX”) are included as benchmarks. In 
addition, we use the Norwegian 3-month zero coupon (“3M-NIBOR”) as a proxy for the risk-
free rate. The returns are structured as arithmetic log-returns1, as arithmetic returns are favored 
when optimizing portfolios and logarithmic returns when modeling time series because it 
allows us to sum weighted averages across equities and sum sub-intervals, respectively (Hu 
and Kercheva, 2007). We summarize key data in table 1. 
 Drilling, supply and small cap oil stocks have decreased the last 18 months, making 
averages negative. The downswing has been substantial for the rest of the equities as well, but 
not enough to make the means negative. Moreover, subsea- and some seismic equities keep 
stand against OSEBX return. The peer benchmark OSLENX performs positive, but worse than 
the diversified alternative OSEBX, and it is less volatile than the stocks. We find the equity 
standard deviations larger than OSEBX, except for Statoil. In addition, the covariance between 
the assets is high on average, although extremes are observed in both directions. Looking at 
correlation structure in the intra-sub-sectors compared to average correlations across all 
sectors strengthen the view of no large differences. We observe drilling, subsea and seismic 
correlations in line with the cross-sectional average around 0.21, with supply and oil somewhat 
higher at 0.33 and 0.27, respectively. We refer to Appendix 1 for Historic correlation matrix. 
We count over 50% of the stocks to have a one-way movement of more than 70% in one 
month, which are spread uniformly across all sub-sectors. The interpretation should be done 
with precautions with Mean-Variance preferences, as tail risk may give rise to extreme losses. 
                                                 
1 Arithmetic log-returns are given by, [∑ ln⁡(1 + 𝑥𝑡)𝑁𝑡=1 ]/𝑁 
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Table 1 – Prior key data (01.02.2009-01.09.2015) 
 
The numbers are based on monthly returns series (including standard deviation – Std.Dev). *Excess Kurtosis is 
kurtosis minus 3. An excess kurtosis of 0 is conformant with the Normal distribution. **Sector Weighted Averages 
Examining higher moments, we note high and varying excess kurtosis for all stocks, 
which makes the distributions deviate from normal distributions with more observations 
around center and in the far-outlier tails of the distribution. Moreover, the measured skewness 
indicates some asymmetry. In general, the distributions are minimal pulled towards the right 
side, making the tail on the left side larger. Thus, the higher movements indicate rejection of 
normal properties, where models relying on normal assumptions may be complemented with 
models incorporating tail-risk. 
Company
Historic/  
SIC EY BL
Historic/ SIC/ 
EY BL*** Historic SIC EY BL
Oil
Statoil (STL) 0.27 0.43 0.94 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.18
DNO International (DNO) -1.59 0.85 1.38 0.20 0.20 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.07
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) -0.92 0.71 1.38 0.21 0.21 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.06
Panoro Energy (PEN) -2.40 1.93 2.95 0.14 0.14 -0.17 -0.15 0.14 0.21
Weighted Average 0.20 0.45 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.17
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 2.38 0.39 1.01 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.10
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) -1.45 0.94 0.91 0.11 0.11 -0.14 -0.11 0.09 0.09
Spectrum (SPU) 2.29 0.76 0.77 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.04
Weighted Average 1.29 0.57 0.97 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.09
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 2.04 0.49 1.35 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.07
Aker ASA (AKER) 1.63 1.04 1.75 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.19
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 1.84 0.63 1.32 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.05
Weighted Average 1.89 0.66 1.45 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.10
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) -0.03 2.05 2.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) -1.73 2.59 1.12 0.11 0.11 -0.16 -0.10 0.24 0.10
Songa Offshore (SONG) -2.79 0.53 1.17 0.17 0.17 -0.16 -0.21 0.03 0.07
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) -2.66 11.60 2.51 0.17 0.17 -0.16 -0.25 0.70 0.15
Weighted Average -0.28 2.13 1.91 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 0.18
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 1.04 2.19 1.34 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.10
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) -2.96 4.69 1.46 0.16 0.16 -0.18 -0.24 0.29 0.09
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) -0.64 3.44 1.28 0.12 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.29 0.11
Farstad Shipping (FAR) -0.52 10.22 1.50 0.16 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 0.63 0.09
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) -1.81 1.60 1.39 0.19 0.19 -0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.07
Weighted Average -0.11 3.28 1.37 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.10
Total Weighted Average 0.36 0.63 1.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.16
OSELENX 0.33 0.05 0.06
OSEBX 1.18 0.05 0.23
Expected Excess return* Sharpe RatioStandard Deviation**
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3. Methodology 
In this chapter, we first present the fundamental valuation methodology and then the different 
models on portfolio theory. 
Framework for the Fundamental Valuation 
A company’s strategic position is determined by its strategic advantage, or ability to generate 
returns above the hurdle rate (Koller et al., 2010). We believe a company achieves a strategic 
advantage by either operating in an industry with an inherent strategic advantage or by 
possessing resources, which gives the company an advantage over its competitors. 
To determine whether a company possesses an external benefit, we first analyze the 
macroeconomic factors affecting the industry with PESTEL, before analyzing the competitive 
situation applying Porter. For the supply/demand analysis, we perform thorough research on 
key drivers within each sub-sector. To determine whether the companies’ possesses an internal 
advantage, we map the key resources they are in possession of with a VRIN framework, and 
then compare them with the resources of the competing companies in the industry. If a 
company possesses resources competitors do not have access to, we consider whether these 
resources gives the company a strategic advantage. In the final step of the analysis we use the 
aforementioned research to prepare a future budget to estimate the companies’ future cash 
flows. We extract an implicit future rate of return on the basis of our FCFE estimates from the 
future budget and the market value of each company today - i.e., which required rate of return 
on equity, based on our FCFE estimates, yield the prevailing market value of the companies’. 
3.1 Strategic Analysis  
Strategy focuses on the utilization of a company’s unique resources to determine if it has a 
competitive advantage and involves internal and external analysis of the firm (Hamberg, 
2014). We believe it is difficult to determine the value of a company without understanding 
the strategic reason why it earns a higher return on invested capital than its competitors. 
3.1.1 PESTEL Analysis 
A PESTEL analysis is used to evaluate an industry’s strategic position by analyzing the 
external factors affecting the environment the industries (Johnson et al., 2011). The PESTEL 
framework provides a comprehensive list of possible impacts on an industry’s strategic 
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success or failure. We therefore believe it is important to identify the industry’s key drivers 
for change and focus on these drivers, which will be the factors with greatest impact on the 
industry. By analyzing how these factors affect the environment the industry operates in and 
how these factors are changing, we are able to evaluate the industry’s strategic position.  
3.1.2 Porters Five Forces 
Michael Porters strategy framework assesses the competitiveness in an industry based on five 
forces and is undertaken from the perspective of a company already operating in the industry 
(Porter, 1979). Even though each company in all industries are unique, the forces driving 
performance and profitability will not be uncommon to all companies (Henry, 2011). These 
five forces are only helpful to identify the competitive environment and profit potential in an 
industry. It is therefore important to build competitive advantage through strategy to mitigate 
or change the pressure of these forces to achieve superior profitability.  
3.1.3 VRIO Analysis 
A VRIO analysis analyzes a company’s strategic position in an industry and looks at its 
resources and then compares these with its competitors (Johnson et al., 2011). To evaluate 
whether the resources a company possess is a source of competitive advantage, the framework 
analyzes the resources based on if they are valuable, rare, imitable or organized. 
3.2 Valuation Methodology 
3.2.1 The Flow-to-Equity Method 
In this thesis, we apply the Flow-to-Equity method (“FTE”). “The Law of One Price implies 
that the price of a security should equal the present value of the expected cash flows an 
investor will receive from owning it” (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). Based on this law, we 
believe FTE, which show the expected cash flow an equity investor will receive from owning 
a stock, represent the appropriate valuation method. As most of the companies in this thesis 
have complex capital structures (Rauh and Sufi, 2010) where the amortization schedule is not 
always predictable, the FTE method offers an advantage (Tergeson, 2001). The disadvantages 
with FTE are the need to compute a company’s debt capacity to determine interest and net 
debt before the capital budgeting decision. Then, the weighted average cost of capital is easier 
to apply (Miles and Ezzell, 1980) However, if a company does not maintain a constant debt-
      
7 
 
to-equity ratio, but the debt amortization schedule is predictable, the adjusted present value 
approach is easier to apply (Myers, 2001). 
The free cash flow to firm (“FCFF”) expresses the net amount of cash available to all 
investors. It shows a company’s profitability after capital expenditures, reinvestments and 
changes in working capital. Using earnings before interest and tax as the starting point, we 
subtract tax, add back non-cash operating expense such as depreciation and subtract 
investments in invested capital to arrive at the FCFF. 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇⁡(1 − 𝑡𝑐) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝. −𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 − ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶    (3.2) 
Where, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, Tc is the corporate tax rate, Capex 
is capital expenditures and NWC is net working capital. However, the FTE method discounts 
the free cash flow to equity (“FCFE”) at the cost of equity to obtain the market value of equity 
and differs from FCFF by after-tax interest expenses and cash flow from net issuance or 
repurchase of debt - i.e., principal repayments minus proceeds from issuance of new debt. FCFE = FCFF – Interest expenses * (1 - tc) + Increases in net debt (3.3) 
The FTE method discounts yearly cash flows plus an estimate of terminal value (Vt) 
(Bodie et al., 2010). In the following equation, we use the Gordon growth model (“GGM”) to 
express the value beyond the explicit forecast period and discount at the cost of equity, ke. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡
(1⁡+⁡𝐾𝑒)𝑡
+
𝑉𝑡
(1⁡+⁡𝐾𝑒)𝑡
⁡⁡𝑡1 ⁡⁡    (3.4) 
where,     Vt = FCFEt+1 / (Ke – g) 
As noted by the formula above, the FCFE are discounted using the equity cost of capital 
determined by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”).  
Cost of Equity 
We use the CAPM developed by Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1964) to estimate the cost of 
equity throughout this thesis. According to this model, the required excess return of an asset 
relative to the market excess return is proportional to the systematic risk of the asset relative 
to the market (Vault, 2005). 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖⁡𝑥⁡(𝐸(𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡) − 𝑟𝑓)⁡⁡     (3.5) 
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Where, rf  is risk-free rate, βi  is beta and rmkt is the market risk premium. Beta measures 
the variations between asset- and general market movements as opposed to idiosyncratic 
factors. 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖,𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡
2 ⁡⁡⁡      (3.6) 
Where 𝜎𝑖,𝑚𝑘𝑡is the covariance between the i’th asset- and the market return, and 𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡2  
is the market variance. The market risk premium is the expected excess return on the market 
portfolio and assumes individuals are rational and base their investment decision on rational 
selection. Moreover, as the model also assumes a risk-free return is always available in the 
market, a rational investor will only invest in the risky asset if he receives a risk premium. 
           𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘⁡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚2 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) = ⁡𝐸(𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡) − 𝑟𝑓⁡    (3.7) 
 Merton (1980) recommends a long time frame to reduce estimation error as it takes 
years of data to produce accurate estimates of E(rm). However, E(rm) is likely to be closer to 
recent historical numbers3. According to Welch and Goyal (2008), as investor’s risk aversion 
has not changed, historic risk premiums give a good estimate of future risk premiums. 
Terminal Value 
The FTE method is a two-periodic model and includes an explicit forecast period and a 
terminal value. The discounted terminal value approximates the net present value of cash flows 
in steady state. This estimate is crucial as the major portion of firm value often lies in the 
terminal value. Out of the two methods pointed out by Pignataro (2013), we apply the multiple 
method in this thesis. According to this method, a firm is worth a multiple of future earnings 
or book value in the terminal period and we assume an industry median multiple in this thesis. 
We apply the mid-cycle exit multiple as using a multiple from the bottom or top of the cycle, 
undervalues and overvalues a company, respectively. Moreover, we use the price-to-earnings 
(“P/E”) multiple, as it is based on a company in steady state with constant industry debt-to-
equity ratio and constant growth in future cash flows and return on equity. 
                                                 
2 See Fama and French (2002), Siegel (2004), Pastor et al. (2008) for an alternative approach for estimating 
market rm. 
3 Welch I. (2000), Graham J. & Harvey C. (2008) and Welch I. & Goyal A. (2008) 
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3.2.2 Relative Valuation 
In relative valuation, the capitalized results represent an estimate of future cash flows and are 
based on the arbitrage pricing theory (Boye and Dahl, 1997). The relative valuation in this 
thesis is intended as a supplement to test the plausibility of our FCFE and we use the guideline 
public companies method (“GPCM”). The GPCM method derives the market value of a 
company from publicly traded peers in the similar line of business (Gaughan, 2011). We use 
forward multiples in this thesis, as unlike historical multiples, forward-looking multiples are 
consistent with the law of one price. Moreover, forward-looking estimates are normalized, 
meaning they better reflect long-term cash flows. Therefore, when conducting the GPCM 
method, we do not predict long-term future estimates for growth, profitability or cost of capital 
(Palepu and Healy, 2008). The first stage is to choose a measure for value, which can be a 
performance measure. The next step is to find a set of peers with similar outlook for long-term 
growth and return. Once a list of peers is collected, the final step is to apply the median 
multiple from the table to the company being valued.  
3.3 Portfolio Theory  
3.3.1 Mean-Variance Optimization 
According to the classical Modern Portfolio Theory (“MPT”), portfolio diversification drives 
the maximum possible return for a given level of risk (Harry Markowitz 1952). MPT aims to 
maximize the Sharpe ratio for a given selection of assets. The optimization process leverage 
from quadratic programming can be expressed as 
max
𝑤
𝑤𝑇𝜇 −⁡
𝜆
2
𝑤𝑇𝛴𝑤     (3.11) 
    𝑠. 𝑡.⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑛=1 = 1, 𝐴𝑥⁡⁡ ≤≥ 𝑏⁡         
where⁡𝜇 is E(r), 𝑤𝑇 are the initial positon of N assets, 𝛴 is the covariance matrix, 𝜆 is 
the risk aversion coefficient and 𝐴𝑥 ≤≥ 𝑏 is a general constraint. 𝐴 is an M X N matrix with 
M rows equal the constraints and N columns equal assets and b is a 1 X N vector of limits. The 
problem can be solved by Lagrange methods and results in optimal allocation under the linear 
equality constraint. This result yields the tangency portfolio, which is the portfolio with 
highest risk adjusted return for all possible combinations of the assets available for the 
optimization. See Appendix 2 for illustrations, MPT assumptions and further insight. 
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3.3.2 Sharpe Ratio 
Sharpe ratio is a measure of performance for evaluation and the objective of optimization. 
Moreover, Sharpe ratio is often referred to as a measure of relative “reward to variability” 
(Sharpe 1966, 1975). According to the definition, Sharpe ratio express excess returns over risk 
free rate divided by the standard deviation of the distribution.  
 𝑆𝑅𝑖 = ⁡
𝜇𝑖−𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑖
     (3.12) 
3.3.3 Information-Ratio 
The information ratio (“IR”) is a common measure to evaluate asset managers and measures 
active returns relative to active risk taken, i.e. manager’s ability to generate excess return 
compared to a benchmark, relative to the risk taken to generate the active part of return. 
𝐼𝑅𝑝⁡ = ⁡
𝜇?̂?−𝑢?̂?
𝜎[𝑥?̂?−𝑥𝑏]̂
    (3.13)  
Where 𝜇?̂? and 𝑢?̂? is portfolio- and benchmark return, and 𝜎[𝑥?̂? − 𝑥𝑏]̂ is the variance of the 
difference return. In a CAPM world we can write⁡ 𝛼𝑝
𝜎𝜀(𝑝)
=
𝜇?̂?−𝑟𝑓+⁡−⁡𝛽𝑝(𝑢?̂?−𝑟𝑓)
[𝜎𝑝
2−⁡𝛽𝑝
2𝜎𝑏
2]⁡0.5
.IR will capture 
selection (α) capabilities stripped for market risk (β).  
3.3.4 The Single Index-Implied Covariance Matrix 
Estimating covariance matrices is a hot topic in portfolio selection due to the inherent flaws 
of the sample covariance. In portfolio optimization, volatile covariance tends to result in 
unstable portfolio weights, which may give rise to high asset turnover when applied to out-of-
sample data (Ledoit and Wolf, 2003). However, we avoid this problem by exploiting the 
structure of CAPM theory and estimate the covariance matrix with less parameters than in the 
unstructured case, Σ4, thus having a smoothing effect. Sharpe (1963) introduced the single-
index model, in which the covariance matrix is given 
                           Φ = 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝜎𝑚2 +⁡Ω𝜖            
where 𝛽 =⁡ (𝛽1,… , 𝛽𝑛)𝑇 is 𝑁⁡X 1 and 𝜎𝑚2  is the variance of the market. Estimator for Φ is 
                                                 
4 With 19 stocks in the sample we estimate 21 parameters (19 betas, market premium and variance). With 
standard covariance we estimate 209 parameters (19 expected returns and variances and 171 covariance’s). 
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Φ̂ = 𝐵𝐵𝑇?̂?𝑚
2 +⁡ Ω̂𝜖      (3.14) 
where 𝐵 = ⁡ (𝑏1,… . , 𝑏𝑛)𝑇  and 𝑏1  is the least squares estimator for 𝛽𝑖⁡ and Ω̂𝜖 =
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜎1,𝜖
2 , … , 𝜎1,𝑁
2 ), which has basis in the OLS-residuals. 𝛽𝑖’s have equivalent interpretation 
as under CAPM, although allowance for α may produce minor differences. 
3.3.5 The Black-Litterman Model  
The Black-Litterman (“BL”) model has its roots in academic recognized theory5 as the model 
propose a method of taking practitioner’s market views into account and combine it with 
Markowitz mean-variance optimization framework. Including variance-covariance and 
expectations of returns, parameters such as view portfolios, confidence level of view portfolios 
and uncertainty on the reference model are needed. The motivation for developing this model 
was to offset some of the flaws to traditional mean-variance models such as unstable behavior 
in portfolio weights due to parameter sensitivity, specification of expected returns for all assets 
in the investment universe and illogical and highly concentrated portfolios (He and Litterman, 
1999). The model is assembled using Bayesian statistics to combine the subjective views 
created on expected return on assets in the portfolio with the market equilibrium returns of all 
the assets in the investment universe. This leads to a new posterior estimate of expected return. 
Expected Returns in Equilibrium 
The BL model is reliant upon general equilibrium theory, i.e. if the aggregated portfolio is at 
equilibrium the sub-portfolios are the same. The investor is categorized with a quadratic utility 
function, where the equilibrium problem is reduced to CAPM and assumptions. Thus, the 
unconstrained optimization on expected equilibrium returns yields weights corresponding to 
the market portfolio6. Then, we are able to back out the equilibrium returns by a reversed 
optimization process. Mathematically, we arrive at the FOC of max
𝑤
𝑤𝑇𝜇 −⁡
𝜆
2
𝑤𝑇𝛴𝑤 by 
substituting optimal weights and collect equilibrium excess return vector⁡𝛱.   
𝑤 = (𝜆𝛴)−1𝜇 → 𝜆⁡𝛴𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑡 = ⁡𝛱,     (3.15) 
because if 𝜇 does equal 𝛱 , 𝑤 will equal 𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑡. 
                                                 
5 Sharpe (1964, 1966, 1974), Markowitz (1952) Black (1989), Black et al (1991, 1992) 
6 When CAPM holds, the tangency portfolio in a MV framework will be equivalent to the market weights. 
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There are N assets in the market, where 𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑡 is the market weights. The expected 
excess return of the N’th asset in the market M is⁡𝜇, a normal distributed random variable with 
mean of 𝜇 and covariance matrix, 𝛴.  
𝜇 = ⁡𝛱 +⁡𝜀𝑡, where ε is 𝑁⁡~⁡(0, 𝜏𝛴)     (3.16) 
Where 𝜆⁡is defined as in chapter 3.3.1. Academics have various views regarding⁡𝜆. He 
and Litterman (1999) argue the average risk aversion across world markets is 2.5 and 
Litterman suggest calculating the implicit risk aversion based on a benchmark index. We use 
the latter as we believe short term risk preferences are more convenient in this thesis. 
  𝜆 = ⁡ 𝜇𝑚𝑘𝑡−⁡𝑟𝑓
𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝑇 Σ𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑡
=
𝑆𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡
𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡
      (3.17) 
Views 
An optimization process according to BL - with defined views on any of the portfolio’s assets 
- will return the market equilibrium portfolio in addition to a weighted sum of the portfolios 
the investor has views. The views are created based on different expectations between investor 
and 𝛱. They can be given linearly in both absolute performance and relative performance of 
assets. We apply only absolute performance views in this thesis. Confidence levels are 
attached, through 𝜏 to add certainty to the estimates. All else equal, reduced confidence level 
will offset declining portfolio weights for an outperforming asset. Absolute performance 
estimate is illustrated by; 𝑃1 will be tilted in an optimal portfolio if expected return is larger 
than equilibrium return. The portfolio weight will be lower in the opposite case.  
Below, we present the diagonal pick matrix (P) K x N, where the number of views, K 
is equal to the number of assets, N. Satchell and Scowcroft (2000) use an equal weighted 
scheme. Weightings are proportional to 1 divided by the number of assets outperforming or 
underperforming. We use the same method to reduce importance of company size. 
 𝑃 = [
𝑃1,1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 𝑃𝐾,𝑁
⁡]     (3.18) 
Mathematically the views can be deduced from a view vector (𝑄)⁡𝐾⁡X 1. 
𝑄 + ⁡𝜀 = [⁡
𝑄1
⋮
𝑄𝑘
] +⁡[
𝜀1
⋮
𝜀𝑘
]       (3.19) 
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The error terms (𝜀) are IID and normally distributed with zero mean and covariance 
matrix of 𝛺. Due to the independence assumption, the covariance’s are zero, and therefore 
results in the diagonal matrix⁡𝛺. 
 𝛺 = [
𝜔1 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝜔𝑘
⁡]     (3.20) 
ω is uncertainty corresponding with each view inversely related to confidences, as 
increased variance will decrease confidences and vice versa. He and Litterman (1999) use a 
method where they set 𝛺 proportional to variance of the prior. This method is mostly applied 
in a canonical framework, therefore is used in this thesis. 
𝛺 = ⁡𝑃𝜏𝛴𝑃𝑇⁡⁡⁡⁡    (3.21) 
Doing it this way makes the combined return vector of excess returns indifferent of⁡𝜏, 
although 𝜏 works as a scaling factor on the variance of the views. Implicit to this assumption 
on the division of variance between matrix 𝛺  and the parameter 𝜏  equals the historical 
variance-covariance matrix of the view portfolio. Therefore, ⁡𝜏  has to be seen as level of 
confidence level to the view estimate of returns. A simple but effective method is calculating 
τ, relies on the fact that the variance of a mean estimation is contrary directional to the sample 
size. Therefore, under quadratic unbiased estimation 
𝜏 = ⁡
1
𝑇−𝑁
      (3.22) 
where 𝑇 is number of samples and N is number of assets. As T is often significant 
larger than⁡𝑁, the model puts more confident in the views.  
Combined Return Vector 
We put together the elements in the last sub-chapter and present the posterior expected return 
and posterior covariance matrix of the BL-model.  
𝜇𝐵𝐿 ⁡= ⁡ [(𝜏𝛴)−1 + 𝑃𝑇⁡𝛺−1𝑃⁡]−1⁡[(𝜏𝛴)−1𝛱 +⁡𝑃𝑇𝛺−1⁡𝑄]  (3.23) 
𝛴𝐵𝐿 ⁡⁡= ⁡ [(𝜏𝛴)−1 + 𝑃𝑇⁡𝛺−1𝑃⁡]−1     (3.24) 
𝜇𝐵𝐿 and 𝛴𝐵𝐿 lies closer to the unknown parameter, 𝜇 with higher precision than either 
the prior or the conditional view distribution. The proof of the BL-formula follows in 
Appendix 3. We affirm the normal distributional assumption still holds. 
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4. Applications  
In the following chapter of this thesis, we first use PESTEL and Porter in the E&P industry to 
analyse the strategic environment and to determine the operational margins. We argue the 
price formation of oil is the key external factor affecting the environment in oil service and 
apply only Porter to these sub-sectors. Next, we investigate the supply-demand balance for oil 
and sub-sectors and perform differentiation analysis on underlying economic conditions on 
equity level using VRIN and extensive research. Finally, the resulting valuations are then 
expressed as views in terms of implied cost of equity.  
4.1 Industry Analysis 
4.1.1 The Oil Market  
PESTEL 
Political Aspects 
We view the political aspects to have significant influence on the E&P industry. Many 
countries have substantial impact on the players in the industry, as they primarily possess the 
ownership rights of both oil and gas resources. By controlling these reserves, governments can 
sell E&P concessions to several companies, which allow them to favor national companies 
and exclude foreign ones. A prominent organization is the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”), which controls more than 80% of the world’s proven oil 
reserves (OPEC Annual Statistical Bullet, 2015). After the Saudi-led change in OPEC`s 
strategy to defend market share regardless of price, we view its geopolitical influence as 
enhanced and likely to increase as oil reserves diminish.  
 We also consider internal political and broader geopolitical risks such as the Arabic 
Spring in 2011 as disruptive for E&P investments, despite strong economic incentives and 
favorable policies in many countries. All such geopolitical tensions and resistance negatively 
affect value creation in the E&P industry.   
Government’s willingness to participate in the policies aimed at reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions, will greatly impact the petroleum industry and we believe the global 
adoption process of renewable energy will reduce E&P companies’ profitability and adversely 
affect growth opportunities. 
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Economical Aspects  
As illustrated in figure 1, the E&P industry is very interdependent with the development in the 
world economy – here shown by the annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product 
(“GDP”) growth compared to annual percentage change in oil consumption. The main reason 
is because economic growth, prosperity and increasing population largely drive oil 
consumption and demand for oil. A positive aspect for E&P companies is the short run 
inelastic oil demand. The time between an oil price change to a respond in the consumer and 
business market is long because most industries and transportation facilities uses oil as a 
source of energy. As the global economy is dependent on continuous supply of oil at a fair 
price, we believe the improvement in the world economy is crucial for the development of the 
E&P industry. 
Figure 1 – Annual GDP and oil consumption correlation 
 
Another important economic aspect affecting the E&P industry is the value of the 
dollar as oil prices are globally denoted in this currency. A Norwegian oil producer selling oil 
in dollars are exposed to currency risk between the Norwegian Krone (“NOK”) and the dollar. 
The stronger dollar rate typically results in a lower oil price per barrel. Oil market participants 
push the price of oil lower as Statoil is entitled to minimum the same price of oil as before in 
NOK, after exchanging dollars into NOK. We therefore believe a good management of the US 
economy should provide some stability for both oil prices and profitability within the E&P 
sector. 
Social Aspects 
Social aspects determine the preferences of societies where E&P companies operate and affect 
the companies partly through their image. As social considerations and increased political 
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focus enforces greener fuel alternatives, and the cost of its production is competitive, we 
believe the economic climate will be less favorable for E&P companies.  
Technological Aspects 
As new reserves are found in deeper water and in more challenging environments, which are 
sometimes not economically feasible to exploit with the current technology, the E&P industry 
is continuously investing in research and development (“R&D”). With modern technology, up 
to 50% of the proven oil can be recovered and with technological breakthrough in locating 
reservoirs, exploring those at a low cost or at a higher recovery rate, we believe E&P 
companies can achieve competitive advantage. In other parts of the value chain, where some 
E&P companies are integrated, technological development such as more efficient oil transport 
through underwater pipelines can improve E&P companies’ margin. We believe technology 
will have thorough impact on the future development of the E&P industry in general and the 
long-term sustainability in particular. In fact, periods of sustained high oil prices have 
encouraged technological development and the development of high-cost fields. Hence, the 
cost of the marginal barrel has increased because of more expensive technology. We therefore 
argue that high oil prices increases costs and not the other way around.   
Environmental Aspects 
Environmental aspects are increasingly affecting E&P companies and their profitability. Over 
the past decades, many E&P companies have been involved in environmental catastrophes 
and held responsible for incidents such as oil spills. Stronger governmental focus towards 
environmental friendly solutions entails heavy capital expenditures in more advanced 
technology in an attempt to reduce pollution to a minimum. All these provisions and 
expenditures serve as a burden for E&P companies’ profitability. 
Legal Aspects 
Legal aspects perform an important role in shaping the E&P industry. E&P companies face 
large upfront concession fees and other royalties and taxes, which are relatively high compared 
to other commercial activities. We believe the major legal concerns affecting E&P companies 
steam from compliance with regulations related to the environment. Current and proposed 
international, national and local climate agreements, fuel conditions, etc. will naturally have 
effect on both the production and profitability of many E&P companies. 
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Porters Five Forces 
 Threats of New Entrants 
We believe the threat of new entrants is low due to high barriers to entry. According to Wood 
Mackenzie (2015), Norway’s Johan Sverdrup costs USD31bn to develop. Not all new entrants 
can support the large capital requirements associated with up-front investments required for 
the development of oil reserves or setting up production facilities. Due to the increased unit 
cost, which according to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008) rose 90% between 2000 
and 2007, another barrier to entry are economies of scale. Only large E&P companies and 
refineries positioned to take advantage of both economies of scale and scope survives and 
prevents new players to gain ground due to the risk. Disadvantages for potential new entrants 
also originate from national government policies, which favor local E&P companies. As the 
state owns oil and reserves, some tend to give access to commodities to national companies. 
 Bargaining Power of Buyers 
There is no product differentiation as oil is a commodity where the price is determined by the 
equilibrium relationship between supply and demand. The willingness to pay is the only 
bargaining power potential buyers possess. Large oil consuming countries like US, the EU, 
China and Japan - which account for more than 50% of global oil consumption (OPEC, 2015) 
- can however exert bargaining power towards E&P companies due to their consumption and 
quantity demanded. 
 Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
Oil producing countries, which are the suppliers of oil, possess bargaining power. Oil is a rare 
and limited resource and without government’s willingness to cooperate with E&P companies 
to exploit it, the oil-related companies have no livelihood in the industry. As more than 80% 
of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in OPEC countries (OPEC Annual Statistical 
Bullet, 2015), which nationalized oil production in their countries from large international 
E&P companies - they possess bargaining power to E&P companies. As a result, OPEC`s 
bargaining power is evident when granting oil field concession rights to E&P companies.  
According to Porretto (2009), oil rich countries were strict to foreign E&P companies 
when the oil price was high and above USD100/bl. After the Saudi-led change in OPEC`s 
strategy caused the oil price to decrease, the bargaining power misbalance changed. With oil 
prices below USD40/bl., some OPEC countries find oil fields uneconomical to develop by 
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their national E&P companies and are turning to major international companies to reduce 
break-even costs to balance fiscal budgets. 
As large E&P companies represent volume buyers from unconsolidated sub-sectors it 
increases the bargaining power. This has become evident the last 12 months where the fall in 
oil prices has led to reduced E&P spending, re-negotiations of existing contracts and 
postponed activities, causing profit to vanish in oil service. 
 Threats of Substitute Products and Services 
As illustrated in figure 2 below, petroleum and other liquids are estimated to account for 33% 
of global energy consumption in 2040 due to being cost efficient compared to the other fuel 
types (EIA, 2015). As the oil value chain adapts to the low oil price environment, we believe 
more sophisticated exploration technologies will emerge and offset increased depletion costs, 
and cause oil to be a competitive sources of energy. 
Figure 2 – Global Energy Consumption by fuel types 
 
Based on the EIA outlook, we find renewables as the threat of substitute as increased 
natural gas market share is positive for E&P companies, coal being a relatively expensive 
alternative for electricity generation due to environmental regulations and strong political 
agenda towards downscaling nuclear programs. Renewable energy sources are forecasted to 
increase from a market share of 8% in 2013 to 10% in 2040. Even though the global adaption 
process will be time consuming, the government’s willingness to change its energy habits in 
favor of renewable energy sources should be considered as a threat, also in the short run. 
 Intensity of Rivalry among Competitors in the Industry 
The competition in the industry is high, which mainly finds its explanation in fierce need to 
replace drying reservoirs and is described as having few major and strong participants and few 
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smaller players with less influence. According to Weston et al. (2001), this has forced some 
major oil producers to opt for mergers and acquisitions and alliances, which increases the 
concentration. Some national E&P companies in the OPEC consortium have put less R&D on 
technology and are effectively operating as cartels, which reduce rivalry among these 
companies. The slow industry growth also intensifies competition among E&P companies.  
High exit barriers lead to intensive battling between the companies in the industry in 
spite of below average or even negative rates of return. As relinquishment of field concession 
rights is easily done as a result of the increased interest from E&P companies to strengthen or 
diversify asset portfolios with new fields, exit barriers are less present in the upstream segment 
of the industry as compared to downstream. Other factors affecting the competition among 
E&P companies are high fixed costs and lack of product differentiation, as oil and gas both 
are commodity products.  
4.1.2 The Price Formation of Oil  
As illustrated in figure 3 below, after a sharp decline from an average USD99/bl. in 2014, 
Bloomberg consensus7 expects Brent to average at USD55/bl. in 2015, USD62/bl. in 2016 and 
USD68/bl. in 2017, whereas the forward curve imply prices of USD54/bl., USD55/bl., and 
USD59/bl. in 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. In addition to the shrinking supply surplus 
going forward, an oil price increase is supported by cost-of-supply reasoning - i.e. the marginal 
cost of extracting one additional barrel is higher than the current price, with US shale having 
a marginal cost of USD68/bl. (Rystad Energy, 2015).  
Figure 3 – Annual average Brent oil price history and future estimates 
 
                                                 
7 Consensus estimates on forward oil prices from a collection of oil analyst across the globe.  
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Demand 
The EIA estimates global oil demand growth of 1.8m barrels per day (“bpd”) in 2015. Demand 
growth in 2016 is expected to return to the long-term normal level of 1.2m bpd. As shown in 
figure 4 and in Appendix 4, global oil demand growth is at the highest since 2010, which we 
believe is supported by lower oil prices. Americas demand growth this year is 0.4m bpd, with 
sharply escalating gasoline demand as the key driver. China and Other Asia (India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) are also important drivers of growth, showing 
resilient demand despite some weakness in the macroeconomic picture.  
Figure 4 – Annual global oil demand growth history and future estimates 
 
The correlation between year-over-year (“YoY”) GDP growth and oil consumption in 
our dataset between 1987 and 2014 showed 0.82, with an explanatory variable (R2) of 0.67. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015), the world GDP is expected to 
grow 3.72% on average in the period 2015 to 2020, above the historical average of 3.5%. 
Based on this, we believe the consumption assumptions above is reasonable as low oil prices 
and interest rates in Europe and in US, and growth in China and Other Asia will help boost 
demand for oil. 
Supply 
The EIA sees non-OPEC supply decline by 0.5m bpd in 2016, down from a 1.2m bpd increase 
this year. As we can see from Appendix 5, the main change in supply is US production, 
estimated to drop by 0.2m bpd in 2016, compared to a 0.8m bpd growth in 2015. Production 
is set to drop in most non-OPEC countries as oil companies prioritize value over volume in 
the current oil price environment. 
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As illustrated in figure 5 below, the EIA estimates a Call-on-OPEC – the crude oil 
OPEC need to produce to balance supply-demand - of 29.7m barrels of oil equivalent per day 
(“boepd”) on average this year, implying a current oversupply of 2m boepd, with September 
OPEC production of 31.7m boepd. Call-on-OPEC rises going forward, with oil demand 
growth at 1.2m bpd and non-OPEC supply estimated to drop by 0.5m bpd in 2016. Assuming 
OPEC production at the current level going forward, physical market balance is set for the 
second half of 2016. 
Figure 5 – Call-on-OPEC and current OPEC production of 31.72m bpd 
 
With stable global oil demand from figure 4, the oil market is supply driven with two 
risks: a) additional Iran barrels on sanctions lifting and b) the resilience of US shale 
production.  
a. Iran Sanctions Lifting 
On October 18, the world powers and Iran agreed to begin meeting their commitments from 
the June 2015 agreement. The day when sanctions are lifted will according to US officials take 
two months, implying additional Iran barrels are set for early 2016 if commitments are met. 
Figure 6, which show the government budget break-even in Brent crude oil price terms given 
the current output, reveilles Iran require a price of USD130/bl. to balance 2015 budgets (The 
Telegraph, 2015). With long-term forward curve of USD59/bl., Iran have strong incentives to 
supply as much oil as possible to reduce budget deficits. 
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Figure 6 – Government budget break-even in Brent crude oil price terms given current output 
 
As illustrated in figure 7, production capacity in Iran before the sanctions was reported 
at 3.5-3.8m bpd, 1m boepd above the current output. Moreover, floating storage is estimated 
to 40m barrels or 0.2m bpd in six months (Euronav, 2015). As the Iranian oil minister estimates 
0.5m boepd can be supplied within a week and 1m boepd within six months from the sanctions 
are lifted, we believe the physical market equilibrium will be delayed if sanctions were to be 
lifted. Refer to Appendix 6 for detailed numbers. 
Figure 7 – Iran oil production before sanctions (2010 and 2011) and after (2014 and 2015) 
 
b. US Oil Production  
As illustrated in figure 8 below, the Baker Hughes US oilrig count stopped declining and 
showed a weekly increase in the month-end June to July 2015, while the US oil production 
increased. This suggests US oil production has become more cost efficient. Despite cost 
deflation and higher productivity, recent supply data disproves the trend from July and US 
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shale production is forced out of the market by high OPEC production with an estimated 2016 
supply growth of -0.2m bpd. 
Figure 8 – U.S. Crude oil production and oilrig count. 
 
Figure 9 below show the global cost curve (excluding dividends or interest payments). 
With an average break-even level of USD68/bl., below the world average at USD50/bl., US 
shale production is struggling to cope in the current oil price environment (Rystad, 2015). 
With redetermination of credit line ongoing in 4Q15 and oil price hedges running out, we 
believe US production will continue to decrease. 
Figure 9 – Global Brent break-even cost curve (excluding dividends or interest payments) 
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 4.1.3 The Oil Service Market – a Strategic Review 
Oil service is a generic term, which includes four sub-sectors: seismic, subsea, offshore drilling 
and offshore supply. Seismic techniques use shock waves sent beneath the seabed, to image 
rock formations for identification and production optimization of oil and gas reserves. Subsea 
relates to the equipment, technology and methods employed in offshore oil and gas 
developments. Offshore drilling is a mechanical process where a wellbore is drilled below the 
seabed by a rig and where offshore supply refers to supply vessels used to transport supplies 
between the supply base and the rigs. We refer to Appendix 7 for a detailed overview. 
Porters Five Forces 
Threats of New Entrants 
Capital to purchase rigs and offshore supply vessels are in principal the only barriers to entry 
in these sub-sectors. Although supply vessels in general and rigs in particular are expensive, 
banks give high leverage on favorable terms. With long-term contract coverage, leverage is 
often a high percentage of the purchase price (Kaldestad and Møller, 2011). Due to the large 
capital expenditures required for high tech supply vessels and large rigs, both sub-sectors are 
industries with high fixed costs. We think this should increase the barriers to entry, in a scenario 
where the expected returns are unattractive. With a mobile rig and supply fleet, no broad 
infrastructural changes necessary and several rigs and supply vessels off contract, the cost of 
switching supplier is low. The result of low to medium barriers to entry is a fragmented market 
with the risk of contracting during upswings. 
The biggest entry barrier in the subsea sub-sector is the buyer switching cost. More 
established companies such as Subsea 7, Technip and Saipem offer a complete service package 
throughout a projects lifetime, which many E&P companies prefer. The product differentiation 
is also high as each project is tailor made for the customer. This creates a strong relationship 
between the customer and the supplier, which is hard to break for a new entrant. The subsea 
industry is also capital-intensive, which requires strong financial resources. 
As seismic surveys are more demanding and contracts to this sub-sector are awarded 
based on track record (i.e. reliability) and reputation, seismic have high barriers to entry. 
Acquiring a seismic contract or sell seismic surveys is essential for entering this market. For 
new entrants with lack of resources, experience and established network, acquiring these 
contracts will be difficult. 
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 Bargaining Power of Buyers 
The balance of power and negotiation leverage have shifted towards buyers, i.e. E&P 
companies, as the sub-sectors are flooded with ample capacity. Many oil service companies 
offer the same service, which leads buyers to seek lower prices and better contract terms. In 
Brazil, Petrobras is cancelling tenders and pushing renegotiation of existing charterers. 23% of 
the listed offshore supply fleet is contracted to Petrobras, which means a supply company often 
delivers all their services to few, large and powerful customers. As drilling companies build 
their business model more or less exclusively on long-term contracts, customers gain high 
bargaining power, due to tenders being a necessity for drillers’ survival. 
The bargaining power of seismic companies against E&P companies is somewhat 
mixed. E&P companies’ willingness to pay is high as without seismic surveys, there will be no 
product. But it is low as the seismic companies are very dependent on the E&P companies in 
order to attain profitability. Large E&P companies will not be dependent on only one seismic 
company, as competitors will be competing to do work with these companies in order to attain 
profitability.  
Customers have limited choices in subsea and end up paying more for the choices 
available. As E&P companies require special customizations, they are also less likely to switch 
to producers who have difficulty meeting their demands.  
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
The main suppliers within oil service are the shipyards – i.e. where rigs and vessels are repaired 
and built. The switching costs between suppliers in both the drilling and offshore supply 
industries are low, which is reflected in these companies’ habit to order newbuildings from 
various shipyards, depending on preferences (quality, price and reliability) at the time of order. 
Even though the subsea and seismic vessels are custom made and are both expensive and time 
consuming to build, there are many national and international shipyards. The power of suppliers 
is, in our view, not likely to increase as many shipyards still offer variety of solutions. 
Threats of Substitute Products and Services 
The only threat of substitute would be if on a large scale the world changed its primary source 
of energy from oil to renewable energy sources. In the drilling industry, we see only substitute 
in subsea constructions and vice versa. As subsea constructions are restricted to extraordinary 
projects with reservoir discovery close to land (i.e. Snøhvit outside of Hammerfest), platforms 
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fixed to the seabed are the preferred solution and subsea constructions are thus not viable in 
most cities. When oil and gas resources in shallow waters have been developed, offshore 
production will come from deep water where platforms fixed to the seabed is not an alternative. 
In the seismic space, marine seismic surveys and electromagnetic techniques are the most 
commonly used. We argue threat from alternative seismic techniques is low as for instance 
Electromagnetic GeoServices, which uses its proprietary electromagnetic technology to support 
E&P companies in their search for offshore oil and gas, has struggled to get adopted by market 
participants since the IPO in 2007. 
 Intensity of Rivalry among Competitors in the Industry 
High exit barriers is a troublesome situation for rig and supply companies. Although a rig or 
supply company goes bankrupt, the capacity is normally not withdrawn from the market as the 
buyer will often achieve greater profitability by allowing the rig or the supply vessel to be in 
the market rather than sending them for scrapping (Kaldestad and Møller, 2011).  
In an industry with high fragmentation where there are numerous small and medium 
sized operators, there is a high intensity of competition. The 10 largest owners within the 
drilling sector accounts for 43% of the total rig fleet, with a number of smaller and medium 
sized fleets operating and where these have few incentive to scrap rigs. Tidewater, the largest 
player in the offshore supply market, holds only 10% of the global fleet and the 10 largest 
players accounts for just above 30% of the fleet. For companies operating in a fragmented 
market, an investment in a new vessel or rig will probably prove significant. This points towards 
disruptions in the supply-demand balance, leading to overcapacity and declining charter rates.  
Even though new subsea entrants such as Ocean Installer and EMAS AMC have won 
contracts from international operators like Statoil and Shell, the three established contractors 
Saipem, Technip and Subsea 7 hold the dominance of the subsea market. Since there are few 
competitors and high product differention, the subsea industry can be interpreted as a 
differentiated oligopoly where a high level of cooperation between players characterizes the 
industry. It can be challenging for a company to meet the customers’ high demand for advanced 
technology and special expertise, which the cooperation between the firms in the industry 
solves. According to Nordea (2015), the subsea fleet is down 12%, with each company taken 
its fair share. Year to date (YTD), supply in seismic is down by 32% measured by the number 
of vessels. With more actions taken, the intensity of rivalry among competitors in these two 
sub-sectors is less compared to drilling and supply. 
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4.1.4 The Seismic Market 
The health of the seismic segment has historically been a reliable indicator of the future health 
of the entire upstream E&P sector, with a correlation between annual Brent oil price and seismic 
revenues of 0.96 in the period 1999 to 2014. When commodity prices are consistently high, 
drilling stops and reduces seismic budgets. When commodity prices are low, seismic budgets 
disappear along with most other budgets. Interestingly and as shown in the delivery schedule 
in figure 10, orders from seismic companies started to slow down before the downturn. 
Figure 10 – Overview of the seismic order book delivery schedule 
 
Supply 
According to Clarkson’s (2015), the seismic fleet consists currently of 50 3D seismic vessels, 
in which there are estimated to be 43 in 2017. However, the seismic fleet has become more 
productive. In 2014, an average 3D seismic vessel acquired 25 sqkm per day (assuming 82% 
utilization8 in line with historical numbers), up from 12 sqkm per day in 1996 according to 
PGS. Moreover, PGS expects the market in 2015 to be 370,000 sqkm. Keeping vessel 
productivity and utilization unchanged from 2014 would imply a need of 48-49 3D seismic 
vessels, below the current fleet. We argue PGS estimates to be too optimistic. The reduction of 
17.5% in seismic activity in 2015 reported by PGS is less than the decline in global exploration 
spending YTD of 36%. Assuming seismic spending declines in line with the overall exploration 
spending imply a need for 37 vessels in 2015, 13 vessels or 26% less than the current fleet or a 
reduction of six vessels from the estimated 2017 levels. 
 
                                                 
8 The proportion of available time that a seismic vessel is operating 
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Demand 
According to a data sample extracted from Bloomberg, the correlation between exploration 
spending and seismic spending has been 0.8 from 2000 to 2014. Two years in the sample stand 
out. In 2000 several E&P companies merged9. All this M&A activity caused seismic spending 
to decline 3% as E&P companies were focused internally. After the financial crisis hit in 
September 2008, E&P companies reduced seismic spending. While exploration spending grew 
by 35% in 2008, seismic spending grew by “only” 17%. Excluding these two outliers, the 
correlation between exploration spending and seismic spending increases to 0.92.  
In late December 2013, Mexico`s President Enrique Pena Nieto signed the constitutional 
change ending Pemex`s 75 year monopoly in Mexico (The Guardian, 2013). Although the 
reform will keep reserves a property of the Mexican state – and Pemex being the sole operator 
– we view a liberalization of the Mexican energy sector as positive. There has so far 
unfortunately been limited seismic activity on the Mexican shelf. There are currently no 3D 
seismic vessels off Mexico compared to six on the US side according to Marine Traffic (2015), 
as the strict contract terms dampen the E&P companies` appetite to explore the shelf. 
Exploration spending is coming down, mainly due to significant decline in Brent oil 
price. But exploration spending was already being reduced when Brent was at USD110/bl. 
While exploration is important for E&P companies, the industry is currently spending more on 
dividend and capex than what it is generating in operational cash flow. According to Bloomberg 
consenus, only 24 % of offshore E&P companies run positive cash flow post dividend. With 
increased cash flow and stronger priority from shareholders to dividends, we believe 
exploration spending will have to be cut to maintain dividend payments and improve cash flow 
going forward, negatively affecting seismic. 
4.1.5 The Subsea Market 
According to Subsea 7 (2015), the scale and complexity of Subsea Umbilical, Riser and 
Flowline (“SURF”) projects continue to grow as new reserves are found in deeper water and in 
more challenging environments. YTD, SURF order intake is down 72% compared to same 
period last year. Although some subsea equipment contracts (“SPS”) are continuing to be 
                                                 
9 Norsk Hydro bought Saga in June 1999, TotalFina merged with ELF in September, and Exxon merged with 
Mobile in November, whereas Chevron merged with Texaco in October 2000. 
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awarded, SPS companies have announced orders worth only USD2.1bn YTD – down 56% 
compared to last year.  
Demand 
Last year, E&P companies started a cash flow fix in order to restore free cash flow, following 
overspending since 2009. We have seen signs of the lengths E&P companies are prepared to 
cut costs as sanctioned projects are put on hold. DNB Markets estimate contracts worth more 
than USD5.0bn have been terminated over the past year and our tracking of cancelled or 
postponed projects in table 2 indicate an increased uptick during 2015. The most common 
explanation for delayed projects is too low oil price. 
Table 2 – Tracking of delayed, terminated and postponed oil and oil service projects 
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Subsea spending is in our view basically a function of oil price and thus exploration 
spending. According to a data sample extracted from Bloomberg, the correlation between 
average yearly Brent oil price and annual subsea revenues has been 0.96 from 1996 to 2014. 
The main input factor for the subsea market going forward will be development of oil price and 
changes in exploration spending. Should the oil price increase or decrease significantly more 
than implied by the forward curve, it would represent upside and downside risk, respectively. 
Our tracking of global exploration spending budgets in table 3 below indicate a decline 
of 36% in 2015 compared to 2014 – the biggest reduction ever recorded in the data sample – 
and shows no sign of increased demand for subsea spending. According to IR in Statoil, subsea 
represents a small portion of exploration spending in the range of 15% to 20%. Zero of the 
major E&P companies report increased exploration spending.  
Table 3 – Tracking of global exploration spending budgets 
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4.1.6 The Drilling Market 
Demand 
The most important leading indicator for the drilling market is the oil price, via its effect on the 
E&P spending. According to Pareto (2015), historical correlations – in normal markets – 
suggest USD1/bl. equates to +/- 1% on E&P spending. In our sample of 43 listed E&P 
companies extracted from Bloomberg, they have not run their operations with positive cash 
flow after dividends and capex since 2008. We expect the sector to continue operating negative 
cash flow in the years ahead. The free cash flow post dividend estimates in figure 11 are based 
on our tracking of capex for global E&P spending from table 4 below, which points towards a 
decline of 23% in 2015 vs. 2014 and down 6% in 2016.  
Figure 11 – E&P companies’ free cash flow post dividend 
 
Few E&P companies have given updated guidance on 2016 spending yet. BG Group 
will spend roughly 6% less than 2015, Total guiding a 15% cut in 2016 and Freeport McMoran 
cutting 29%. With Brent forward curve of USD55/bl. in 2016 and Chevron recently guiding for 
2016 capex of USD25bn to USD28bn, 25% lower than 2015 spending, we argue 2016 E&P 
spending risk and thus demand development is on the downside. Six companies have given 
updated guidance for 2017 E&P spending. On average they cut spending by 9% in 2017 
compared to 2016. 
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Table 4 – Tracking of capex for global exploration and production spending among E&P companies 
  
As illustrated in figure 12, which show the overall rig utilization10 development over the last 
year for the competitive rig fleet, utilization rate is a leading indicator for demand and activity 
in the offshore drilling industry (Ringelund et al., 2015 and Osmundsen et al., 2012). There are 
                                                 
10 Calculated as the ratio of working rigs to the number of available rigs. 
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ongoing discussions between operators and contractors regarding terms in existing drilling 
contracts. National oil companies such as Saudi Aramco and Pemex are aggressive in re-
negotiating day rates, while international oil companies re-deliver rigs and pay 65-80% of 
remaining backlog due to the cost saving from other spread costs (Songa, 2015). Based on our 
tracking of E&P spending, we argue demand will decrease further and negatively impact the 
utilization rate going forward. Due to lower utilization rates, we expect day rates to decline, 
which in turn will lead to accelerating stacking and scrapping activity.  
Figure 12 – Overall offshore rig utilization  
 
Supply 
The drilling sub-sector is suffering from a combination of contracting demand and supply 
growth. As illustrated in figure 13 below, the current rig order book implies a growth in the rig 
fleet of 27% as a percentage of the current fleet (Clarkson’s, 2015). According to IHS-Petrodata 
(2015), the floater fleet is expected to increase from 310 rigs in 2015 to 399 rigs in 2020, 
whereas the jack up fleet is estimated to increase from 544 to 673 rigs. This translates into an 
increase of 28% and 24% in the period for the floater and jack up fleet, respectively.  
Figure 13 – Current orderbook as a % of the current fleet 
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The relative high fragmentation of ownership within drilling means companies are less 
incentivized to stack vessels with the aim to improve market balance. The 10 largest owners 
within the sector accounts for 43% of the total offshore rig fleet, with a number of smaller fleets 
operating and where these have few incentive to scarp vessels. However, we believe there is 
scrapping potential in the rig sector due to i) high stacking- and re-activation costs and ii) an 
old fleet. Offshore drilling is a capital-intensive industry, and cold stacking a floater cost 
USD10k to USD15k a day, with deactivating and reactivation cost of USD1m and USD5m, 
respectively. Although the duration of cold stacking can vary, cold-stacked rigs are out of 
service for a period of time and not considered part of marketable supply (Rigzone, 2015). Rigs 
will therefore not return to market immediately when rates start move towards cash break-even 
levels. Nearly half of the rig fleet consists of units above 20 years and large drillers with many 
old legacy rigs are now retiring and scrapping old rigs despite lower scrap steel values and high 
exit barriers. According to Ensco management (Ensco, 2015), rigs older than 30 years will be 
stacked permanently once off contract. We currently track 20 floaters and 45 jack-ups aged 
more than 30 years going off contract at year-end. We believe stacking and scrapping will 
continue in the coming quarters. This in turn adds further pressure on already depressed 
earnings estimates and reduces long-term earnings capacity.  
4.1.7 The Offshore Supply Market 
Supply 
The offshore supply vessel (“OSV“) market, which is production exposed – with 70% of the 
global fleet engaged in work related to E&P companies` production activities – has been supply 
driven post 2008, with an overall compounded annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 5% the past 
ten years. Both the aforementioned growing rig fleet and more vessel intensive deep-water 
campaigns have absorbed much of this capacity, but it has also resulted in orders for new builds, 
lagging activity with 12-18m (ICS, 2011). Vessels ordered during the peak in 2013/2014 are 
entering the market, with 139 Anchor Handling Tug Vessels’ (“AHTS”) and 266 Platform 
Supply Vessels (“PSV”) currently under construction, comprising 11% and 21.5% of the fleet, 
respectively. However, slippage remains high, with only 30% of the AHTS` and PSVs 
scheduled for delivery in 1H15 actually delivered YTD. This is not only due to constrained yard 
capacity and owners delaying newbuildings, but we believe there will be a number of vessels 
not entering the market.  
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As illustrated in figure 14 below, the AHTS market has a low order book compared to 
PSV, but we believe this is due to major E&P companies shift away from the operation of 
AHTS to more fuel efficient PSVs when the oil price rose during peak season in 2013/2014. 
We do not think we will see this continue with low bunker costs. Moreover, AHTS are typically 
uneconomical to utilize for cargo work due to higher fuel consumption (larger engines) and 
smaller deck/tank space. The newbuilding in the PSV market are spread between large and mid-
size tonnage, with the majority over the past 12 months in the mid-size segment. We believe 
small PSVs have limited future demand as E&P companies upgrade their size and capability 
requirements to exploit economies of scale. Despite vessels being cold stacked and retired, we 
see continued net supply growth in 2016 and 2017, especially in the PSV segment, which is not 
encouraging (Clarkson’s, 2015). 
Figure 14 – AHTS (LHS) and PSV (RHS) fleet and growth in % of the fleet 
  
Demand 
As OSV activity is a derivative of rig activity, declining drilling and offshore project activity 
coupled with high supply growth imposes a further strain on utilization and day rates. As shown 
in figure 15, cash break-even for a modern PSV with 60% loan-to-value (“LTV”) and 12-year 
redemption profile is in the range NOK130k to NOK140k. In comparison, the average North 
Sea PSV spot rate was NOK157k in 2013, NOK127k in 2014 and NOK58.9k YTD. 
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Figure 15 – PSV spot rate and estimated cash break-even for a modern PSV with 60% loan-to-
value and 12-year redemption profile 
 
Data points from Clarkson’s (2015) points to 1-2 year term charter day rates below 
NOK100k for large modern PSVs compared to operating expenses of NOK75k. Spot rates in 
the AHTS segment is also below the estimated cash break-even rate. In addition, we believe a 
demand issue for the AHTS market is the local content requirement in Brazil where owners of 
Brazilian flagged tonnage block and replace foreign vessels under existing charters 
(Maritime.no, 2015). Although this clause has been in Petrobras contracts for years, it has not 
been used until now. A number of foreign flagged vessels on long-term charters have lost their 
license to operate in Brazilian waters, resulting in relocation to other regions.  
We believe a way to look at the supply/demand situation is to calculate the OSV to rig 
ratio. Although several factors such as regional differences, water depths, and vessel size will 
impact the number of OSVs per rig in different regions, it gives an idea of the market balance. 
As illustrated in figure 16 below, it currently points towards and excess number of OSVs per 
rig given the forward Brent oil price curve and the current demand situation.  
Figure 16 – Number of OSVs per rig in relation to the Brent oil price 
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There is limited scrapping potential in OSV, although 25% and 19% of the current 
AHTS and PSV fleet is older than 20 years. OSVs have less retrievable steel limiting the scrap 
value, which depending on mobilization and the size of the vessel can amount to zero (Aas et 
al, 2009). In addition, the steel price has plummet alongside the oil price. This creates few 
incentives for vessel owners to scrap vessels, preferring to cold stack at USD1k/day, ahead of 
a potential marked recovery. These vessels will return to the market when rates move up. 
Tidewater, the largest OSV player, holds only 10% of the global OSV fleet and the 10 largest 
accounts for 30% of the fleet, with a number of smaller fleets operating and where these have 
few incentive to scrap vessels. We thus expect more vessels to be retired and cold stacked and 
future earnings potential to decrease. 
4.2 Company Valuations  
Statoil - Sell 
Statoil is Norway`s largest oil company and is 67% owned by the Norwegian government. They 
have a different approach than European peers with higher exposure to upstream activities, 
which is a disadvantage a low oil price environment. The main issue in Statoil is dividends. 
Statoil said it would reduce spending so FCFF covers dividend. This was at oil prices above 
USD50/bl. For 2016, most capex is committed but there is capex flexibility from 2017, in the 
range NOK5bn to NOK7bn annually. In a scenario with Brent at USD45/bl. throughout 2016, 
Statoil will generate negative FCFF for 2015 and 2016 of about NOK45bn. With dividend 
payment of USD2.8bn, this implies new funds are required during 2H16. On our estimates, 
Statoil approaches the ceiling of the guided 15-30% gearing threshold with 29.7% NIBD to 
capital employed by the end of 2016. With a lasting low oil price in 2016, the gearing ratio 
breaks the 30% threshold. This will force the company to divest more of its asset base or take 
capex cuts from 2017. With this threshold breach for longer periods, and the absence of oil 
price recovery would in our opinion put pressure on dividend. Statoil offers a 6% dividend yield 
compared to a 5-year rolling average of 5.4%. The yield to interest rate spread is at a 9-year 
high, while the historical yield gap to European peers has closed. Dividends continue to attract 
investor’s attention and after the major Italian E&P company ENI cut dividend in March, the 
share price dropped 10%. Conclusion: Statoil should be one of the last to cut dividend due to 
its recent cost cuts, lower capital intensity and balance sheet flexibility. However, with dividend 
yield above historical figures, high upstream exposure and a potential oil price around 
USD50/bl. beyond 2016, dividend cuts looks inevitable. With Statoil trading at a premium to 
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10-year average at 16x, 12.9x and 10.1x on 1-, 2-, and 3-year forward earnings, respectively, 
we view risk/reward as unfavourable. 
Det Norske Oljeselskap – Neutral 
Det Norske Oljeselskap production steams from eight high-quality projects. The most 
prominent one is the 11.57% share in Johan Sverdrup, which is due on stream in 4Q19 and 
profitable at or below USD40/bl. according to Wood Mackenzie. The main issue in Det Norske 
Oljeselskap is financing. On our estimates, Det Norske Oljeselskap is fully financed until Johan 
Sverdrup first oil. In December 2015, the next redetermination of its borrowing base in the 
reserve based lending facility (“RBL”) takes place, potentially involving a reduction in light of 
the oil price drop. On the forward curve - which is often used in budgeting - Det Norske 
Oljeselskap is fully financed even if the borrowing base is reduced to USD2.2bn from the 
current USD2.9bn set in June (DETNOR, 2015). According to Det Norske Oljeselskap, more 
liquidity is required if the borrowing base is reduced to USD2.2bn with an oil price at 
USD48/bl. or below through 2017. We believe the attractive portfolio is valuable for the 
company in terms of securing liquidity through RBL. It also positions Det Norske Oljeselskap 
as an acquisition target11. However, we do not believe Aker (50% stake) is selling exposure to 
Sverdrup in the current oil environment. Conclusion: As Det Norske Oljeselskap trades at an 
implied long-term Brent oil price in the low 70s on our FCFE estimates and with no discount 
to underlying values, we find the risk/reward to be balanced. 
DNO International - Buy 
DNO International (“DNO”) is an oil company where most of the value is in the 62% share in 
the Tawke field in Kurdistan. The oil is primarily exported through a pipeline to Turkey, the 
rest is sold locally at a lower price. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has nearly not paid 
the oil companies extracting oil in Kurdistan for its oil. In 2013, KRG did not pay DNO and in 
December 2014 they got USD21m from KRG. DNO estimates KRG owe the company 
USD947m, of which USD829m are for exported oil and USD118m are for oil sold locally. The 
reason why KRG has not paid oil companies for exports is because they have argued with the 
central government in Baghdad over the distribution of Iraq`s oil revenues, which struggle to 
                                                 
11 For readings on what determines an potential acquisition target, see: Where M&A Strays and Where it Pays: 
A survey of the research", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Fall 2004, pp. 63-76. University of Rochester 
Roundtable on Corporate M&A and Shareholder Value", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Fall 2005, pp. 
64-84. Dobbs, Nand and Rehm, "Merger Valuation", The McKinsey Quarterly, 2005 Special edition, pp. 67-73. 
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transfer money to KRG partly because of the war with ISIL. However, KRG have also had 
expenses related to terrorist threats in the area and the development of social functions and 
governing systems. In August, KRG announced a plan to pay DNO monthly from September 
to cover their operating costs and increase the amounts so they can pay off the outstanding 
liabilities from 2016. In September, the Natural Resources Ministry announced to KRG it had 
authorized the first tranche of regular payments to E&P companies in Kurdistan as USD30m 
were headed to DNO. We believe KRG realise this is required for further investments in the 
region. KRG estimates an average production of 600k boepd in 2015. Assuming a monthly 
KRG budget of USD750m and ignoring KRG revenues from taxes, oil price at USD42/bl. is 
required to balance the budget. As KRG has managed to improve its financial situation by 
scaling up independent sales to compensate for budget shortfall from Iraqi, we believe KRG is 
able to pay DNO. With KRG`s incentives and increasing ability to make payments for running 
exports, we believe this is a start of rebuilding credibility around regular payments. 
Conclusion: With a market capitalization of USD1.08bn and DNO estimate of USD947m in 
undiscounted outstanding receivables to KRG, we do not believe export payments is reflected 
in valuation. When sanctions against Iran are lifted, DNO is well positioned to enter the market 
and with the expertise and infrastructure in place, Iran entry is also a potential trigger. 
Panoro Energy - Buy 
Panoro Energy is a small oil company with two assets. It owns 30% of the producing Dussafu 
asset in Gabon and 14% in the Aje field in Nigeria, which is set for production start-up at the 
end of January 2016. Panoro Energy expects production rates of around 1,100 boepd net to the 
company (9,000 boepd gross). Despite a tight funding situation with USD13m of USD17.1m 
cash balance committed to the Aje development, we believe Panoro Energy can establish a debt 
facility with attractive terms as Aje can serve as collateral. After evaluation of seismic data, 
Panoro Energy reports gross un-risked resources at the Dussafu prospect in Gabon above 1m 
barrels and four locations high-graded for potential exploratory drilling in 2016. Panoro Energy 
can thus farm down some of its stake in Dussafu if terms are attractive. Conclusion: We believe 
start-up at Aje will increase visibility and narrow the discount to underlying values as investors 
look for on-going production in the current market environment. 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company - Sell 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company (“TGS”) remains the seismic company with the best 
business model to tackle the on-going weak market. The company has no debt and a flexible 
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cost base as it benefits from chartering cheaper seismic vessels from vessel owners. However, 
as a market leader within multi-client (“MC”)12, which declined by 28% from 1H14 to 1H15, 
it is indeed affected by the weak market. When a seismic company shoots MC, MC amortization 
is decided from how well the seismic company expects the survey to sell. There is a time gap 
between when a survey becomes a non-performer to when a seismic company has to book a 
write-down to prevent this survey from remaining on the balance sheet. In November 2015, 
TGS announced USD150m impairment in its MC library. Since 1Q06 TGS has booked an 
average MC amortization of 42%. In the same period it has sold its MC investments 1.8x. The 
sales performance would imply an MC amortization of 56%. If MC amortization should have 
matched sales performance, the EBIT should have been USD846m lower. An impairment of 
USD846m, above the USD150m booked in November, would be needed in the TGS library to 
adjust accounting to sales performance using the last ten years as a proxy. In 2012 and 2013 
when oil prices were above USD100/bl. and the sales outlook were positive, they invested high 
amount in MC seismic. They continued with this in 2014, even if E&P companies decreased 
exploration spending. Now, TGS is stuck with expensive MC libraries on the balance sheet it 
try to sell to E&P companies, which have less to spend on MC seismic. Conclusion: Even 
though MC impairments are less of an issue as they are non-cash and TGS is a debt free 
company, investors still look on earnings multiples and price to book metrics within seismic. 
Therefore, we believe impairments are negative for the share price. 
Petroleum Geo-Services - Sell 
Petroleum Geo-Services (“PGS”) have no issues in this market given available financing in 
Japanese export credit and revolving credit facility, on our estimates. However, we believe the 
booked MC Library of USD807m is inflated. Since 1Q06, PGS has amortized its MC library 
with an average MC amortization of 46%, expecting to generate 2.2x on MC investments. 
Simultaneously, PGS has realized 1.7x sales on their MC investments, implying an MC 
amortization of 50% would have been needed if amortization were to match sales performance. 
This would result in USD659m in increased MC amortization, MC book value of USD148m, a 
discount of 82% compared to current values. Conclusion: We expect PGS to report large 
impairments going forward and are inclined to have a negative view on the stock.  
 
                                                 
12 The multi-client library consists of seismic data surveys to be licensed to customers on a nonexclusive basis. 
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Spectrum – Sell 
Spectrums MC strategy focus on establishing oil and gas regions and frontier13 areas with 2D 
seismic. Spectrums small size makes it vulnerable for quarterly fluctuations and the reduction 
in exploration spending among E&P companies in frontier areas in particular makes the 
company even more exposed. Spectrum signed in September 2015 an agreement with the 
government of Somalia where the company received the exclusive right to acquire up to 28,000 
km 2D MC seismic off the coastline. We expect frontier areas like Somalia to see steeper cut 
backs into 2016 and 2017 than mature areas such as the North Sea and US GoM. Consensus 
expects Spectrum not to cut dividend and achieve a YoY revenue growth of 24% in 2016. In 
June, Spectrum announced they had acquired Fugro`s MC library for USD115m, below book 
value of USD178m. We view the debt repayment schedule of 15 months to be too aggressive 
given our modelled cash flow in Spectrums and expect a renegotiated structure, as the company 
will run out of cash in the second half of 2016. Conclusion: Based on the too aggressive debt 
repayment schedule, we assume Spectrum to cut dividend, which in our view is negative for 
the share price. 
Subsea 7 - Neutral 
As illustrated in table 5 below, investing in Subsea 7 is mainly getting exposure to subsea 
spending in Petrobras, Total and Statoil. These customers represent more than 50% of contract 
value announced since 2006. 
Table 5 – SUBC top 10 customers 
 
The top 10 customers of Subsea 7 have guided an average decline in 2015 E&P spending 
of 18% compared to 2014, below the industry average of 23%. In 2016, E&P spending is set to 
increase with 2% for this group on average, which indicate moderate top line expectations for 
Subsea 7 compared to other sub-sectors. The key markets for Subsea 7 in the same period (2006-
                                                 
13 Frontier areas are considered remote regions, far from markets and established infrastructure, and in harsh 
climates or difficult environments, including water depths in excess of 200 meters (Offshore-mag, 2015). 
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2014), have been Brazil, North Sea and Angola with 31%, 17% and 15% share of the total 
contract value, respectively. We therefore believe the key is to look for the three combinations, 
Petrobras in Brazil, Total in Angola and Statoil in Norway when screening future subsea 
projects. SpareBank 1 Markets track 91 subsea projects globally. On this list we find 18 projects 
matching the characteristics, which we view as positive. However, Subsea 7 has currently seven 
pipe lay support vessels on contract for Petrobras off Brazil. Given the smaller size of Brazilian 
built vessels, two vessels could potentially be blocked by the Brazilian regulation (Seven 
Condor and Normand Seven). These vessels contribute with USD81 per vessel per year in 
estimated revenues for Subsea 7. Conclusion: We exclude only one vessel in our SUBC 
estimate and are inclined to have a neutral view on the stock due to marginally positive project 
outlook.  
 Aker Solutions - Sell 
Historically, Brent oil price and Aker Solutions revenues shows a correlation of 0.87. Spending 
from the three main clients (Statoil, Petrobras and Total) show a correlation of 0.92 with Aker 
Solutions revenues. However, there is low correlation between revenues and EBITDA margin. 
We believe the key to high margins for Aker Solutions is delivering projects as bid. Aker 
Solutions operates not only within subsea, but has operations within engineering and 
maintenance, modifications and operations (MMO). The subsea business unit accounted for 
almost 60% of total revenue and 70% of EBITDA in 2014. The main competitors for Aker 
Solutions subsea division are FMC Technologies, One Subsea, Drill-Quip and GE Oil & Gas. 
In 2004, AKSO had subsea revenues of USD1.1bn, above FMC at USD1bn. In 2014, FMC had 
subsea revenues of USD4.7bn compared to Aker Solutions USD2.7bn. Customers clearly 
preferred the subsea equipment from FMC. Conclusion: We believe this trend will reinforce 
itself going forward as a larger installed base for its competitors will also drive aftersales. And 
as aftersales and services have larger margins compared to new equipment, we believe Aker 
Solutions will underperform compared to peers, which is negative for the share price. Moreover, 
according to SpareBank 1 Markets, Aker Solutions is deemed as front-runner for subsea 
equipment contracts in zero of the 91 globally tracked subsea projects.  
Aker - Buy 
Aker is an industrial investment company specialized in the oil and gas, seafood and marine 
biotechnology sectors and has, among other, 34.8% in Aker Solutions, 34.5% and 50% in Det 
Norske Oljeselskap. Aker is trading on a 43% discount to net asset values (NAV), above historic 
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median of 38% (Bloomberg, 2015) compared to Investor AB and Kinnevik AB below historic 
discount to NAV at 8%. Conclusion: With a well-diversified portfolio of assets and a cash 
balance of NOK2.9bn, we believe the company is positioned to acquire cheap assets in the 
current down cycle and find the discount to peers unwarranted. On our estimates, Aker is able 
to generate NOK8.7 per share in cash per year pre debt repayments in 2016 and 2017. Pricing 
on yield in line with historical average of 5%, imply NOK219 per share above the current share 
price. 
Seadrill - Sell 
Seadrill is well positioned given its high backlog and fleet quality with average age of 8 years, 
but we are worried about the financial leverage and long-term liquidity shortfall. We think 
Seadrill have to prioritize strengthening the balance sheet. Steps have already been initiated 
with cut in dividends prolonged newbuilding capex. We estimate no capital needs before 2017 
assuming no un-contracted floaters delivered in 2016, as operating cash flow and cash at hand 
will cover USD2bn of scheduled debt maturities. Assuming most out of the 14 newbuildings 
delivered during 2017, we estimate a funding need of USD5.5bn, of which USD4bn related to 
newbuildings. Without delivery of newbuildings, we end up with a funding gap of USD1.6bn, 
as new rigs do not add material positive cash flow. Even if Seadrill manages to cancel its 
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (“DSME”) drillships and the Rigel floater from 
Jurong Shipyard in Singapore, we expect these yards to contest cancellations, pushing out 
repayment of potential refund guarantees. Conclusion: With an absent and unexpected market 
recovery into 2017, we think there will be need for a larger equity injection to fund some of the 
funding gap, which would drive dilution of existing shareholders. 
Fred Olsen Energy - Sell 
With poor order backlog, only two rigs contracted beyond 2017, we view all remaining nine 
rigs at risk due to the high average fleet age of 25 years in Fred Olsen Energy. Belford, one of 
Fred Olsen Energy’s rigs completed its 100-day yard-stay, as the last special periodic survey 
(required classification to continue operate the rig) near-term. Our main concern relates to re-
deployment of this rig. Bredford, Borgholm and Borgny are stacked and as demand recovery is 
unlikely, we believe Belford, Byford and Borgsten will be permanently stacked. Byford rolls 
off contract in 2016, Statoil is expected to release Bideford in early 2017 and Borgsten will 
struggle to secure more work beyond its Total contract. Moreover, Chevron cancelled Bollsta, 
a newbuilding scheduled for a 5-year contract on the delayed Rosebank field and Borgland will 
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roll off contract in 1Q17 instead of 4Q17. Conclusion: We believe Fred Olsen Energy will 
become a 1-3 rig company where 7-9 rigs will be cannibalized and struggle to identify positive 
triggers and see only downside in long-term earnings capacity. 
Songa Offshore - Sell 
With seven floater rigs, where two are newbuildings and three are more than 30 years and off 
contract during 2016, the financial situations in general and liquidity in particular is the key 
issue in Songa Offshore. With fully funded NIBD of USD2.7bn matching Bloomberg 
consensus gross asset value, equity value in Songa Offshore is questionable. Given the debt-
loaded balance sheet, we view new equity as the only alternative, which will represent a dilution 
for existing shareholders. While this will remove near-term liquidity concerns, the capital 
structure will remain fragile and we think it will force restructuring, including conversion of 
bond debt to equity, resulting in more dilution. This is further pressured by the need of 
USD100m in liquidity through 2017 in the wake of the expected release of the three incumbent 
rigs Trym, Delta and Dee. Trym, Dee and Delta are due for rollovers in 2016, and with low 
visible demand in Norway, we view redeployment of all rigs unlikely. If work is secured for all 
rigs we expect cash shortfall in late 2016, as we do not expect potential work to justify the 
USD75 to USD100m special periodic survey cost for Delta. On top of this comes a potential 
liability from the dispute with DSME over the price tag of the four Cat-D rigs (World Maritime 
News, 2015). Conclusion: Based on high redeployment risk, near-term liquidity concerns as a 
result of the high debt per ultra deepwater equivalent from figure 17, we have a negative view 
on the stock. 
Figure 17 – Debt per ultra-deepwater equivalent 
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Sevan Drilling - Sell 
Sevan Drilling consist of three floater rigs and one floater newbuilding. With an NIBD of 
USD423m per rig compared to average offshore construction cost mid-2013 of USD500m, we 
see limited equity value for shareholders, even if we assume cancellation of the newbuilding 
Developer and repayment of the USD105m refund guarantee. According to Sevan Drilling 
(2015), the Developer rig remains ready for delivery in China. In light of the 4-step deferral 
agreement14 with the shipyard, we think a cancellation is unlikely before late 2017. Delivery of 
Developer is also unlikely, even if contract is secured, as current day rates would not allow for 
sufficient debt financing of the remaining USD425m capex. We therefore assume Driller to be 
stacked, clearly negative for the long-term earnings potential. Moreover, assuming stable 
operations, the remaining USD160m Seadrill revolving credit facility will allow for sufficient 
cash until maturity in 4Q16. However, we view the long-term capital structure unsustainable as 
debt amortization exceeds cash flow generated from three rigs. Conclusion: We therefore view 
debt restructuring imminent and equity injection necessary to get banks on-board - diluting 
existing shareholders. If the floater rig Driller does not get renewed with Petrobras during 1H16 
or corruption probes in Brazil culminates in contract cancellation or financial penalties, debt 
restructuring will accelerate. 
Prosafe - Sell 
Prosafe is the world’s leading owner and operator of accommodation vessels15. The company 
owns and operates 12 semi-submersibles and has three newbuildings under construction. In the 
current market, there is risk of at least one of the China newbuildings not securing contract 
during 2016. In such scenario, we estimate Prosafe to breach debt covenants. Moreover, supply 
outlook remains challenging with an order book of 60% of the current fleet. We believe the 
fierce competition will trigger stacking and/or crapping. Prosafe also need to fill backlog on 11 
out of 15 units in 2017. In combination with low tendering activity and cutback in E&P 
spending, we expect this to result in a drop in utilization and rates in 2017 at the expense of 
margins. Conclusion: With few positive triggers, we think focus will remain on a weak market 
and limited earnings visibility beyond 2016. On top comes the counterparty risk and delayed 
                                                 
14 Delivery of Developer was deferred for 12 months with mutually agreed options, exercisable at 6-month 
intervals, to extend the delivery date for up to a total of 36 months from October 2014. 
15 Accommodation vessels are used wherever there is a need for additional accommodation, engineering, and 
construction or storage capacity offshore. 
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payments related to the five Pemex unites in Mexico, which could culminate in need for new 
equity or expensive debt when the NOK500m bond matures in 1Q17. 
Siem Offshore - Sell 
Siem Offshore received approval from its shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting in 
August 2015 for a rights issue of USD100m, fully underwritten by the largest shareholder Siem 
Europe Sarl. Siem Offshore also received approval from banks for extension of a NOK2.5bn 
credit facility for six AHTS newbuildings, which was due to expire in November and easing of 
certain covenant requirements (TradeWinds, 2015). This highlights the importance a strong 
owner and illustrates Siem`s willingness to act to weather a downturn. With nine out of ten 
large AHTS vessels without contract and North Sea and spot rates below opex, we estimate a 
negative EBITDA contribution from this segment, more AHTSs to be stacked and decreased 
earnings capacity long-term. Conclusion: Based on decreased earnings capacity and as the 
AHTS segment accounted for 40% of EBITDA in 2014, we are worried whether the steps taken 
to strengthen the balance sheet is sufficient and have a negative view on the stock. 
Solstad Offshore – Neutral 
45% of the Solstad Offshore fleet consist of construction support vessels (CSC16) and the 
business unit accounted for 60% of EBITDA in 2014. In august 2015, a customer of Solstad 
Offshore extended the contract for the CSV Normand Installer with minimum 200 days in 2016 
and Solstad Offshore signed two new contracts for CSV Normand Baltic, securing 180 days 
from August. Day rates were undisclosed but Upstream (2015) indicate solid margins on new 
contracts, which is a positive sign. However, as illustrated in figure 18 below, in terms of 
contract coverage calculated as number of days, Solstad Offshore is in worse shape. Only 36% 
and 19% of working days in 2016 and 2017 respectively, is secured YTD, which is clearly 
negative. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 CSCs are used to support complex offshore construction, installation, maintenance and other sophisticated 
operations (Maritime-connector, 2015). CSV`s are also larger and more specialised than other offshore vessels. 
 47 
 
Figure 18 - Contract coverage calculated as number of days in 2016 (LHS) in 2017 (RHS) 
  
Solstad Offshore will generate NOK1.65bn in operational cash by 2017 compared to 
debt amortization of NOK2.5bn, excluding bank balloons and bond debt of in total NOK1.3bn 
on our estimates. Solstad Offshore has refinanced bank balloons redeeming in 2015, and is in 
discussions with banks on refinancing the 2016 debt. Assuming Solstad Offshore repay the 
NOK700m bond in February 2016, Solstad Offshore needs to find a solution to its current debt 
amortization profile. Conclusion: We believe new equity and/or expensive debt in 2017 is 
likely and believes bondholders of SOFF03 and SOFF04 are better positioned and prefer debt 
to equity. 
Deep Sea Supply - Buy 
During autumn 2015, a number of Deep Sea Supply contracts have been cancelled, six vessels 
are blocked in Brazil, 10 PSVs are in lay-up and more vessels will follow. With only 23% of 
the fleet contracted in 2016 and LTV increasing as asset values continue to slide (Clarkson’s, 
2015), we see increasing refinancing risk related to the USD117m bank balloon redeeming in 
October 2016. However, low cash break-even, option-like pricing, and large discount to 
underlying values supports a positive view on the stock in our opinion. Compared to most other 
OSV companies, we argue Deep Sea Supply will maintain a comfortable cash balance 
throughout the current downturn, due to the low cash break-even level compared to peers. Deep 
Sea Supply has a favourable amortization profile, no newbuilding capex and no bond debt and 
can therefore bid lower than peers in order to secure utilization on vessels, which we view as a 
competitive advantage. On our estimates, we assume average PSV and AHTS day rates for 
Deep Sea Supply vessels to drop 15-20% and expect another three vessels to be laid up from 
the current level of ten. For the remainder of the fleet we assume utilization of 70%, which 
imply almost one-third of its vessels will remain idle post contract at full opex level. However, 
Deep Sea Supply will still maintain a comfortable cash balance in this scenario. Conclusion: 
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Based on a comfortable cash balance even on conservative estimates during this downcycle, we 
have a positive view on the stock. 
Farstad - Sell 
Petrobras is cancelling tenders and pushing for renegotiation of existing charters. We view this 
counterparty risk as a material disadvantage for Farstad, which according to figure 19 below, 
have more than 20% of its fleet contracted to Petrobras. Deep Sea Supply has an advantage in 
low cash break-even if rates should be lowered and Dolphin enjoys the competitive advantage 
of having 15-17 vessels with Brazilian flag when competing for new contracts or when 
negotiating on extensions. 
Figure 19 - % of fleet contracted to Petrobras by company 
 
Farstad has also a high fleet age compared to peers and is one of the companies within the OSV 
sub-sector with highest spot exposure. According to Farstad, 17 vessels are currently spot or 
listed on short-term contracts in the North Sea (5), Singapore or Australia (9), and in Brazil or 
South America (3). For these vessels we assume a utilization of 20-65% depending on region 
and age. Deep Sea Supply need to cut dividends to zero in 2016 to avoid adding additional cash, 
which we view as negative in the current low interest rate environment. Moreover, refinancing 
risk remains high should vessels in Brazil be block or stacked. Conclusion: Based on high fleet 
age, high spot exposure and large part of the fleet contracted to Petrobras, which is cancelling 
tenders and pushing for renegotiation, we have a negative view on the stock. 
4.2.1 Valuation Summary  
The main argument for performing a historical financial analysis is to gain insight into the 
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budget estimating the companies’ future cash flows. However, E&P and oil service are both 
cyclical industries highly dependent on a commodity. As these industries are in the middle of a 
crisis, we argue historical results over the last years are not comparable to the current market 
environment or the short-term market outlook. The future cash flow projections in our 19 excel 
models are therefore based on the market and company analysis in section 4 and 5, not on 
historical normalized numbers. 
 In our industry analysis we argue the current downturn will last into 2017 and as E&P 
and oil service are cyclical industries, we assume the companies on average to reach mid-cycle 
state in 2020, growing at a constant rate and earning a constant rate of return (Dobbs and Koller, 
2005). Therefore, the explicit forecast period in our future cash flow projections last until 2020. 
However, the FTE model is a two-periodic model, which incorporates an explicit forecast 
period and a terminal value. We use a mid-cycle median industry exit P/E multiple for each 
respective sub-sector extracted from Bloomberg (Chadda et al., 2004). We believe using mid-
cycle exit multiples is the most appropriate approach as using a multiple from the bottom or top 
of the economic cycle would undervalue and overvalue the companies, respectively. 
 In the long-run companies in the same industry typically have similar expected growth 
rates, profitability and risk and multiples are likely to be relatively homogeneous across 
companies in an industry, and potentially as reliable as estimating the value based on an explicit 
forecast of distant cash flows (Bodie et al., 2010). We apply a relative valuation intended as a 
supplement to the FTE method to determine the target price and believe it will help test the 
plausibility of the FCFE forecasts. For a cyclical company, earnings at any given time are not 
a good proxy for future cash flows, in which a normalized figure better represents the 
company’s long-term earnings power. We therefore use a historical mid-cycle median industry 
P/E multiple to determine the target price. 
 Findings from the valuation are presented in table x below. Our estimates of the cost of 
equity is an implicit future cost of equity (“COE”) extracted on the basis of our FCFE estimates, 
which is based on 19 extensive excel models and the strategic and financial analysis above, and 
the market value of each company today - i.e., which required COE, based on our FCFE 
estimates, yield the prevailing market value of the companies’.  
The markets assessment of cost of equity is calculated on the basis of the one-year 
forward earnings yield, i.e. the normalized Bloomberg consensus earnings per share for 2016 
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divided by the current market price per share assuming zero present value of growth 
opportunities. The earnings yield is used by investment managers to determine optimal asset 
allocation and is basically the inverse of the P/E ratio. If we assume a firm pays 100% of its 
earnings in dividends, the share price using GGM with growth (g) equal to zero is 
𝑃0 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆1/𝑅𝑒      (3.1) 
Table 5 – Results from the valuation (Share price as of 01.09.15) 
 
*Recommendations. **COE is Cost of Equity. 
Company Share Price Rec.* Target Price Upside to Target Yearly Monthly Yearly Monthly
Oil
Statoil (STL) 142.0 Sell 130.0 -8.5% 6.0% 0.50 % 5.6% 0.46 %
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) 54.1 Neutral 55.0 1.7% 11.1% 0.92 % 9.5% 0.79 %
DNO International (DNO) 9.2 Buy 15.0 63.0% 9.3% 0.78 % 10.3% 0.86 %
Panoro Energy (PEN) 0.7 Buy 2.0 185.7% 23.6% 1.97 % 58.5% 4.87 %
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 178.0 Sell 155.0 -12.9% 5.5% 0.46 % 6.9% 0.57 %
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) 39.8 Sell 37.0 -7.0% 12.1% 1.01 % 5.0% 0.42 %
Spectrum (SPU) 31.8 Sell 28.0 -11.9% 9.9% 0.83 % 6.9% 0.57 %
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 69.0 Neutral 69.0 0.0% 6.7% 0.56 % 11.4% 0.95 %
Aker ASA (AKER) 173.0 Buy 193.0 11.6% 13.3% 1.11 % 29.7% 2.47 %
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 38.0 Sell 30.0 -21.1% 8.4% 0.70 % 5.8% 0.48 %
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) 55.7 Sell 40.6 -27.1% 25.4% 2.12 % 27.8% 2.31 %
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) 50.4 Sell 25.0 -50.4% 31.9% 2.66 % 17.2% 1.44 %
Songa Offshore (SONG) 1.4 Sell 0.5 -64.3% 7.2% 0.60 % 24.4% 2.03 %
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) 6.5 Sell 5.0 -23.1% 140.1% 11.67 % 43.5% 3.62 %
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 23.0 Sell 18.0 -21.7% 27.1% 2.26 % 18.5% 1.54 %
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) 1.8 Neutral 1.8 0.0% 57.1% 4.76 % 7.7% 0.64 %
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) 31.6 Neutral 28.0 -11.4% 42.1% 3.51 % 25.4% 2.12 %
Farstad Shipping (FAR) 23.9 Neutral 20.0 -16.3% 123.5% 10.29 % 4.9% 0.41 %
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) 2.8 Buy 4.0 42.9% 20.0% 1.67 % 11.8% 0.99 %
Our Estimates of Implied COE**Market Pricing Inverse P/E
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5. Results 
This section evaluates the performance of our four models of portfolio choice. The models are 
as follows: 1) Historical Return (“Historic”), which is based on estimated parameters directly 
from the historical return series, 2) Single-Index Covariance Matrix (“SIC”), which combines 
the historical mean with the Single-index beta-based covariance matrix. 3) Market-Implied 
Earnings Yield (“EY”), which incorporates expected returns from the inverse market-implied 
P/E multiple. It uses the historical estimated covariance matrix. 4) Black-Litterman (“BL”) 
which incorporates subjective valuations from the previous section. Moreover, we will analyze 
the Mean-Variance (“MV”) optimal tangency solution dictated by the models in a short 
restricted- and unrestricted case and employ ex ante and ex post measures of performance. We 
consistently use monthly figures, except in figure 20 and 21. 
5.1 Assumptions  
Trading costs 
We implement total trading costs in our one-period investment horizon, without rebalancing, to 
give more accurate comparison across long and short portfolios. The costs consist of two parts, 
transaction (brokerage) cost and security lending cost. Since the investor in this thesis is a 
marginal investor, the transaction cost is 0.02%. We could have set 0.01%, but we use 0.02% 
to punish models that allocate over gross 100% harder (Sparebank 1 Markets, 2015). When 
investors sell a stock short, the investor is by law obligated to lend stocks from a security pool, 
administrated by SIX X-Clear17, which hold the stock meanwhile the stocks are sold short. 
Thus, security-lending costs apply. We implement Sparebank 1 Markets’ costs of NIBOR 3-
month + 350 points, with a bottom threshold of 6% minimum yearly rate. Based on today’s 
interest rate level, the lower threshold is reached. Therefore, the monthly (yearly) effective 
interest rate is 0.49% (6%). In addition, SIX X-Clear prohibits shorting in Spectrum and Sevan 
Drilling as the stocks have never been rented to the lending pool (Six X-Clear, 2015). We make 
the same assumption and constrain them in the optimization, 𝑤𝑆𝑃𝑈 ≥ 0⁡, 𝑤𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐷𝑅 ≥ 0 . We 
further assume the indices can be traded via an Exchange Traded Fund (“ETF”)18 with costs of 
0.01%, to implement risk-adjusted measures net of costs.   
                                                 
17 SIX X-clear is the Central Clearing Part granting authority by The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
to regulate clearing, risk management and settlement activities at Oslo Stocks Exchange 
18 ETF is marketable securities tracking an index to achieve the same return and risk profile as the index. 
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OSLENX and Statoil constrain 
The Energy Index, OSELNX, consists of 90% Statoil and 10% of companies whose businesses 
are dominated by minor E&P, seismic, rig, drilling equipment and other energy related service 
and equipment. In addition, refining and/or transportation companies of oil and gas products 
are included, yet with a minor stake. Therefore, OSLENX is a good benchmark for comparison 
bets in oil-related stocks, although we find through the industry analysis, that Statoil is not a 
bet we want to engage. With insight in Statoil properties from the applied modeling 
frameworks, we know Statoil has attractive historic risk in a risk-averse MV-framework and 
equilibrium returns, 𝛱 in BL, which should yield dominant allocation to Statoil. To limit impact 
of Statoil on the portfolios, we constrain the optimization problem to allocate maximum 40% 
in Statoil, 𝑤𝑆𝑇𝐿 ⁡≤ 0.4.The final portfolio will become more diversified and influenced by the 
subjective valuation opinions formed on the equities. Although, we are intentionally giving the 
modeled portfolios a boundary for how alike the portfolios are OSLENX, which may drive 
major differences in the performance. In addition, OSLENX is not tradable via an ETF, which 
makes it non-investable unless we structure the index fund our self and maintain continuously 
market weights through frequent rebalancing. This would trigger large transaction cost, thus 
drive expected return down. We also acknowledge the complex modeling effort of using the 
strategy, which is not the objective of this thesis. Nevertheless, we include the Energy index to 
keep track on our active bet against Statoil.  
5.2 Single-Index Covariance Matrix 
We illustrate the estimated covariance matrix, Φ̂ , by corresponding correlation matrix for 
comparison of cross-dependencies of assets. We emphasize the simplification will not interrupt 
the findings. We know all the resulting Φ̂ is positive, as shown in table 6 below, since none of 
our estimated β’s is negative.  
By comparison with historic correlations in Appendix 1, we find the correlation fairly 
more cross-sectional stable and moderate. As SIC covariance structure only unify covariance 
in systematic risk taking, we might unintentionally eliminate common risk factors as day rates 
in supply and drilling or the degree of new oil reservoirs on ultra-deep water demanding 
services from Subsea-sector, which should drive engineering cost. Nevertheless, since CAPM 
and efficient investments rule, these occurrences are not systematic risk factors and thus 
irrelevant, and SIC has legitimacy. 
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To compare the SIC correlations with the Historic correlations, unsystematic risk 
contribute to increase correlation relative to the pure market driven correlations we roll out here. 
Moreover, the average sector correlations are reduced, compared to Historic. We see a reduction 
of 0.14, 0.02, 0.03, 0.18 and 0.24 in drilling, subsea, seismic, oil and supply, respectively. The 
reduction was highly expected due to elimination of sub-sector specific risk. 
Table 6 –Single-Index correlation matrix 
 
Bold correlation-parameters are marked to stipulate the negative correlations appearing with the historic 
method. 
5.3 Black-Litterman   
Firstly, applying the long restriction on Statoil will move allocation away from the prior market 
weights of the unconstrained optimization of the equilibrium returns, Π. And produce combined 
return vector not entirely affected by CAPM equilibrium and the view-vector, 𝑄, but also by 
optimization technicalities. By doing this, we question the assumptions of BL, but we judge it 
as a necessity to produce portfolios incorporating our preferred bets.  
The combined return vector, 𝜇𝐵𝐿 is positive, unlike the rest of the frameworks (except 
EY), which is mainly due to the analyzed equities are interrelated through the oil price, yielding 
an overall positive correlation structure. In addition, our views are defined positive, which 
makes⁡𝜇𝐵𝐿 non-negative. Moreover, the risk aversion coefficient, λ has also influence on Π. λ 
works as a scaling factor on Π, as we demand a higher return for a given risk level. Our 
SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR SUBC AKER AKSO TGS PGS SPU STL DNO DETNOR PEN PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC
SDRL 1.00 0.08 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.45 0.18 0.37 0.32 0.14 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.27 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.19
FOE 1.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04
SONG 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
SEVDR 1.00 0.12 0.26 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.11
SUBC 1.00 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10
AKER 1.00 0.21 0.45 0.39 0.17 0.49 0.24 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.18 0.23
AKSO 1.00 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09
TGS 1.00 0.31 0.14 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.19
PGS 1.00 0.12 0.34 0.17 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.16
SPU 1.00 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07
STL 1.00 0.21 0.11 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.20
DNO 1.00 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10
DETNOR 1.00 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05
PEN 1.00 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14
PRS 1.00 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07
SIOFF 1.00 0.08 0.08 0.11
SOFF 1.00 0.06 0.07
FAR 1.00 0.08
DESSC 1.00
 54 
 
estimated λ is 4.87, which tilt the Π, relative to Litterman’s model suggestion of 2.5. The relative 
weight of each asset in our sample will also tilt Π, as all hold the sample (market-) weights in 
equilibrium.  
The views,⁡𝑄, impact on 𝜇𝐵𝐿are vulnerable to especially⁡𝜏, which is a type of confidence 
in 𝑄. We arrive at an estimate of 0.016, which means we put a relatively average confidence in 
our views as alternative methods of estimating 𝜏 suggests 0.025 or 1/N = 0.0125. We emphasize 
that view variance, 𝛺 is set proportional to 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝛴), where 𝛴 is the prior covariance matrix, 
which also scale 𝑄’s impact on 𝜇𝐵𝐿. 
In figure 20, we observe the normal properties are intact and the views have not 
substantially changed the distributions as the posterior covariance matrix, 𝛴𝐵𝐿 do not differ 
from 𝛴,⁡although the difference between posterior, 𝜇𝐵𝐿and prior,⁡𝛱 for some stocks is notable. 
We note the difference as 𝜇𝐵𝐿-⁡𝛱. Panoro has a positive difference from prior of 1.20%, mainly 
colored by the optimistic view. In Seismic, TGS differs with -0.31%, PGS with -0.38% and 
SPU with -0.67%. In the subsea segment, Aker Solutions differs with -0.63%. However, Solstad 
Offshore with 0.54%, Songa Offshore with 0.90%, Aker with 0.16% and Fred Olsen Energy 
with, 0.34% are viewed to perform to some extend better than the prior. Consequently, 𝑄 
influence 𝜇𝐵𝐿 positively. For full list, see Appendix 8.  
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Figure 20 – Probability density function of BL prior and posterior 
Red line; Prior distribution N(Π,⁡𝛴) ; constructed on the parameters of equilibrium returns and the historical 
variance matrix. Blue line; Posterior distribution N(𝜇𝐵𝐿 ,⁡𝛴𝐵𝐿) ; constructed on the parameters of combined return 
vector and the view blended variance. The distributions are modeled with yearly data, leveraging from 𝑆𝑑𝑇 =
⁡𝑆𝑑𝑡√𝑇 and 𝐸𝑟𝑇 = ⁡𝑇⁡𝐸𝑟𝑡. 
 56 
 
We analyze Statoil to give an example. In figure 21, we see the mean is moved with -
0.29% from prior to posterior. The reason for this is 𝑄, the views, impose a monthly expected 
return of 0.47%, while the prior,⁡𝛱 impose an expected return of 1.3%. This is caused by a low 
implied cost of equity,⁡𝑄 steaming from a sell recommendation, which move the posterior, 𝜇𝐵𝐿 
downwards from the prior. The low variance of Statoil, makes the 𝑄 estimate precise, which 
lower 𝜇𝐵𝐿 more than if the variance was high, because it makes it more certain that the 𝜇𝐵𝐿 lies 
closer 𝑄, according to Bayesian statistics. The large 𝛱 is mainly due to the large Statoil weight 
(90%) in our sample and the low 𝛴 tilting equilibrium return. The reasoning is that CAPM 
optimal portfolios demand the equilibrium return of Statoil to be the optimal returns backed out 
from the reverse and unconstrained mean-variance optimization process. λ also tilts 𝛱, but are 
not extraordinary for Statoil and 𝛴𝐵𝐿 are more or less equal to 𝛴.⁡ 
 
Figure 21 – Probability density function of Statoil - prior and posterior 
 
Red line; Prior distribution N(Π,⁡𝛴) ; constructed on the parameters of equilibrium returns and the historical 
variance matrix. Blue line; Posterior distribution N(𝜇𝐵𝐿 ,⁡𝛴𝐵𝐿) ; constructed on the parameters of combined return 
vector and the view blended variance. The distribution are modeled with yearly data, leveraging from 𝑆𝑑𝑇 =
⁡𝑆𝑑𝑡√𝑇 and 𝐸𝑟𝑇 = ⁡𝑇⁡𝐸𝑟𝑡. 
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5.4 Portfolio Allocation 
Portfolio weights and returns are presented in Table 8 and Figure 22. Table 7 contains key-
parameters of the equities.  
5.4.1 Long Only - Markowitz   
The long only restriction gives boundaries for exploiting high correlation structures with 
correspondingly negative returns across the analyzed equities. Thus, the allocation is more 
centered on assets generating the highest risk-adjusted return and foster less diversification. 
Moreover, the inherent CAPM diversification in the BL framework makes allocation more 
widespread than the other models. Thus, nine equities get allocation in the BL framework 
compared to three, six and five in Historic, SIC and EY, respectively. Wider allocation reduces 
the magnitude of firm-specific risk, which should foster more stability in portfolio returns 
according to MV-theory and favor BL.  
There is some pattern of allocation across the models. BL puts most of the wealth in oil 
and drilling, while Historic and SIC favors seismic and subsea whereas EY favors drilling and 
supply. We will examine allocations to the sub-sectors in the following. 
Oil allocation 
EY and BL methods allocate to the sector, although not to the same assets. Statoil get a large 
allocation in BL of 27.39%, despite the sell recommendation, as the market weight of Statoil 
tilts the equilibrium return, 𝛱. Conversely, the buy recommendation on Panoro results in an 
allocation weight of 22.7%, which is due to high Sharpe ratio of 0.21. EY allocates to DNO 
International and Det Norske Oljeselskap for the reason of low and negative correlation 
structure to the other assets in the portfolio. This is offset against the less-contribution of risk-
adjusted return of DNO International and Det Norske Oljeselskap compared other equities 
having larger Sharpe’s.  
Seismic allocation 
Historic and SIC allocate to seismic. 50% and 65% of the wealth are allocated in TGS for 
Historic and SIC, respectively. The reason is the high Sharpe at 0.23 and 0.18 for Historic and 
SIC. From EY and BL standpoint, there is no allocation to seismic due to unattractive Sharpes.  
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Subsea allocation 
Aker is the most popular investment across the methods. Although our recommendation is buy, 
both Historic and SIC allocate more than BL. We claim this is in lack of more attractive risk-
return profile of the equities, as the historic return profile has negative expected return on 13 of 
19 stocks and small Sharpe for many of the other assets. From SIC perspective, Subsea 7 has a 
higher Sharpe at 0.13 compared to Aker and Aker Solutions at 0.08 and 0.10, respectively. Due 
to the large exposure, in TGS, the correlation structure is of importance. As Akers correlation 
is relatively low, a proportion is invested in Aker even though for low Sharpe compared in the 
sector. Further, BL have 16.45% allocation to Aker, which is in line with the positive view 
return, 𝑄. 
 Drilling allocation 
Each of the four equities is given a sell recommendation. Contradictory, we find BL allocate 
24% of total wealth to the segment, distributed to all four equities. Seadrill and Sevan Drilling 
qualify to an allocation of 4.11% and 5.74% with a Sharpe of 0.19 and 0.15. Fred Olsen Energy 
and Songa Offshore get portfolio weights of 7.25% and 7.10%, with Sharpe’s of 0.10 and 0.07. 
The reason for this is mainly due to low correlation against the other assets, where especially 
Songa Offshore is near zero-correlated to the other assets. In addition, the view return, 𝑄 is 
relatively high in light of the sell recommendation. In the EY framework, Sevan Drilling has a 
Sharpe of 0.70 with a resulting weight of 39.13%, which in our opinion needs to be interpreted 
as artificial high, and therefore with precautions.  
Supply allocation 
PRS get 11.15% allocation in SIC and 0.98% in BL, both with a Sharpe of 0.10. In SIC, the 
allocation is mainly due to top-tier Sharpe ratio, whereas in BL, we observe a low or negative 
correlation. EY gives a large portfolio weight to Farstad with a Sharpe ratio of 0.63. Same 
precautions as for Sevan Drilling should be taken. An expected monthly return of 10.22% 
results in a high Sharpe ratio and the allocation of 46.28%. Even with a neutral recommendation 
and Sharpe of 0.11, Solstad Offshore gets a relatively high allocation of 8.28% in the BL 
framework, which is the highest within BL in the supply segment. This is mainly driven by a 
relatively high view return,⁡𝑄 for the neutral recommendation given on Solstad Offshore, as we 
see equities with buy recommendation having lower view return,𝑄 .Combining this with a 
relatively high equilibrium return, Π, particularly because of low correlation structure, yield 
allocation.   
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5.4.2 Short - Markowitz 
When we loosen the assumption of shorting, we should according to CAPM maintain a positive 
efficient frontier if we are in equilibrium state. As we find negative weights in the modeled 
tangency portfolios, we are deviating from equilibrium and alpha return is expected to revert to 
equilibrium state on individual stock basis (Roll and Levy, 2015). We analyze a composition 
of companies, having the same ambient drivers, thus we find opportunities of exploiting 
correlation structures. Yet, we arrive at broader portfolios, which triggers transaction- and 
lending cost. We also find negative expected returns for the Historic and SIC models allowing 
for expected arbitrage, which is a breach to equilibrium pricing.  
18 of 19 stocks are being allocated to for all models, with a varying composition through 
the models. However, we see some general trends on aggregated sub-sector level. We see oil is 
beneficial as no of the models allocate less than 30% to oil. Moreover, we see all models except 
BL allocated with positive weights to seismic, all but EY allocates positive to subsea, only BL 
are positive to drilling and only EY are positive on supply. Lastly, the EY framework has the 
largest absolute allocations, which should foster instability.  
Oil allocation  
In the oil segment, Statoil is binding constrain of maximum allocation for Historic, SIC and 
EY, hence the allocation is 40%. The main rationale for high allocation to Statoil is low risk 
and high correlation structure to the rest of the assets, which makes it more attractive when 
correlation can be exploited to the full. Panoro is being short allocated within all models except 
BL, driven by negative Sharpe for Historic and SIC. Yet, for EY it is more likely to do with the 
positive extreme risk-adjusted returns Farstad and Sevan Drilling produce. Therefore, a need 
for equities too short to leverage from high Sharpe arises. Historic has a long position in Det 
Norske Oljeselskap. Considering the negative Sharpe, we find the correlations to other assets 
as extremely favorable.  
Seismic allocation  
We find TGS decisive for the BL model performance, as the other models are considerably long 
TGS with at least 30%. However, BL is short by 11.20%, which is compliant with the sell 
recommendation. A consensus conception on short preferences on PGS has to do with negative 
expected risk-adjusted return for the Historic and SIC, and near zero Sharpe in the two last 
models. 
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Subsea allocation 
Historic reduces allocation with 23% compared to long only portfolio to the sub-sector, which 
is primarily due to reduction in Aker. We argue the reduction is due to inherent purpose of non-
restricted optimization. With allowance for use of negative returns and correlation structures to 
offset risk and increase expected returns of equities are Aker relatively less favorable than in 
long only case. We find that SIC maintain high allocation to Aker due to a smoothened noise 
factor in the correlation structure. 
Drilling allocation 
EY allocate with a net exposure of 0.46%, apportioned on especially short Seadrill and long 
Sevan Drilling. Although we see the exposure fall on Sevan Drilling (with high Sharpe) from 
the restricted short case, the reasoning is similar to the above-mentioned Aker case for the 
Historic model. BL increase total drilling allocation with 14.48%. The increased allocation to 
BL is breaching with our view on the sector. 
Supply allocation 
In the supply segment, EY allocates approximate 107% long and 41% short. With a 100% 
investment in Farstad the model is even more vulnerable than in the long only portfolio. Farstad 
is shorted equity for BL and Historic, but not for SIC. The view returns,⁡𝑄 in BL-framework 
corresponds with a negative allocation to supply. Although, Solstad Offshore have become a 
long exposure for BL, as the Sharpe is relatively high. SIC and Historic are exploiting negative 
return of Solstad Offshore to offset risk against other allocations. 
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Table 7 –Key parameters of modeled equities 
 
*Percentage expected return over risk-free rate on a monthly basis. **Monthly Standard Deviation***Estimated 
with excess return, as may give rise to small differences when there are many negative observations. We assume 
the problem is minimal due to a low risk-free rate. 
Company
Historic/  
SIC EY BL
Historic/ SIC/ 
EY BL*** Historic SIC EY BL
Oil
Statoil (STL) 0.27 0.43 0.94 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.18
DNO International (DNO) -1.59 0.85 1.38 0.20 0.20 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.07
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) -0.92 0.71 1.38 0.21 0.21 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.06
Panoro Energy (PEN) -2.40 1.93 2.95 0.14 0.14 -0.17 -0.15 0.14 0.21
Weighted Average 0.20 0.45 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.17
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 2.38 0.39 1.01 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.10
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) -1.45 0.94 0.91 0.11 0.11 -0.14 -0.11 0.09 0.09
Spectrum (SPU) 2.29 0.76 0.77 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.04
Weighted Average 1.29 0.57 0.97 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.09
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 2.04 0.49 1.35 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.07
Aker ASA (AKER) 1.63 1.04 1.75 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.19
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 1.84 0.63 1.32 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.05
Weighted Average 1.89 0.66 1.45 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.10
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) -0.03 2.05 2.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) -1.73 2.59 1.12 0.11 0.11 -0.16 -0.10 0.24 0.10
Songa Offshore (SONG) -2.79 0.53 1.17 0.17 0.17 -0.16 -0.21 0.03 0.07
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) -2.66 11.60 2.51 0.17 0.17 -0.16 -0.25 0.70 0.15
Weighted Average -0.28 2.13 1.91 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 0.18
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 1.04 2.19 1.34 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.10
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) -2.96 4.69 1.46 0.16 0.16 -0.18 -0.24 0.29 0.09
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) -0.64 3.44 1.28 0.12 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.29 0.11
Farstad Shipping (FAR) -0.52 10.22 1.50 0.16 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 0.63 0.09
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) -1.81 1.60 1.39 0.19 0.19 -0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.07
Weighted Average -0.11 3.28 1.37 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.10
Total Weighted Average 0.36 0.63 1.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.16
OSELENX 0.33 0.05 0.06
OSEBX 1.18 0.05 0.23
Expected Excess return* Sharpe RatioStandard Deviation**
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Table 8 –Mean-Variance optimized portfolio weights 
 
The weights are given in percentages. *Rec. is the recommendation for each of the assets. 
 Sharpe ratio performance  
In figure 22, we evaluate the portfolios in ex ante environment with respect to Sharpe ratio 
criteria. Expected performance of BL is better than both the benchmarks in long case with a 
Sharpe of 0.25, but performers equal to OSEBX with allowance for shorting, which gives a 
Sharpe of 0.23. The peer-benchmark index OSLENX is expected to perform absolutely the 
poorest with a Sharpe of 0.09. This is mainly due to a low Sharpe of Statoil as Statoil accounts 
for 85% of the market capitalization of OSLENX benchmark. We also find the other portfolios 
are performing better than BL model, except for long Historic and SIC models. This is result is 
mainly due to the moderating abilities of the CAPM equilibrium returns, which removes noise 
Company Historic SIC EY BL Historic SIC EY BL Rec.*
Oil
Statoil (STL) 27.39      40.00         40.00      40.00        37.78         Sell
DNO International (DNO) 0.64        3.56           -1.59       5.38          -1.84         Neutral
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) 9.95        15.66         0.82        0.62          -1.41         Buy
Panoro Energy (PEN) 22.70      -15.23        -8.15       -13.09       26.24         Buy
Sum 10.59      50.09      43.99         31.09      32.90        60.76         
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 64.45          47.06       57.91         29.43      37.61        -11.22       Sell
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) -23.54        -9.10       5.70          -8.08         Sell
Spectrum (SPU) 2.35         1.94           4.37        Sell
Sum 64.45          49.41       36.31         24.70      43.31        -19.30       
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 3.97         -2.48          3.80        -50.34       2.63           Neutral
Aker ASA (AKER) 35.32          33.44       16.45      12.36         30.40      2.16          25.18         Buy
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 0.24            2.03         2.16           2.04        5.77          -1.60         Sell
Sum 35.55          39.44       16.45      12.04         36.24      -42.41      26.21         
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) 4.11        -5.18          -2.55       -31.22       14.59         Sell
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) 7.25        3.89           8.76        0.66          5.61           Sell
Songa Offshore (SONG) 7.10        1.37           -0.63       4.87          7.05           Sell
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) 39.13      5.74        26.16        11.44         Sell
Sum 39.13      24.20      0.08           5.57        0.46          38.69         
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 11.15       0.98        4.91           13.36      -8.64         3.81           Sell
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) 3.99        -3.13          -13.36     6.67          -8.77         Neutral
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) 8.28        29.48         5.74        -18.28       14.09         Neutral
Farstad Shipping (FAR) 46.28      -9.89          0.26        99.94        -12.33       Neutral
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) -13.77        -3.59       -13.95       -3.16         Buy
Sum 11.15       50.28      9.26        7.59           2.40        65.74        -6.35         
Only Long Short
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attached to the estimates compared to historic calculated estimates and therefore lowers 
expected returns.  
The Sharpe ratios indicate dominance of EY with Sharpe ratios of 0.90 and 1.14 in long 
and short case. High expected returns of Farstad and Sevan Drilling drives superior expected 
risk-adjusted portfolio return. The extreme return vector relates to high consensus earnings 
estimates21 for 2016 in relation to the current stock price. We see the stock price have come 
down the last two years, whereas consensus estimates lag, making implied earnings yield 
increase correspondingly. The rational is that behavioral finance aspects influence irrational 
actions in investor’s mind-set regarding these stocks, making valuations inconsequent and share 
prices to drop more than consensus estimates. Moreover, option-like pricing of the stocks can 
explain the economic rationale (Copeland and Antikarov, 2005). With market capitalization-to-
enterprise value below 10%, the market expects the companies to either survive or end up in 
financial distress (Hotchkiss et al., 2008), which yields an extreme expected return if the 
companies survive. 
We find large differences in risk-adjusted returns. Short restricting the portfolios 
provides shrinkage of Sharpe ratio from the case where shorting are allowed. This finding is 
mainly due to reinforcement of the long allocations in the short strategy by going short the 
equities with low- /negative risk-adjusted return. This is especially evident for the Historic and 
SIC models which has negative returns for some equities. Negative returns foster expected risk-
free return, which is meaningless in an equilibrium world. Since the analyzed equities have a 
high correlation the negative returns are even more decisive and tilt portfolio Sharpe ratios.  
Even though the return vector dominate covariance input parameter in the optimization, 
we find that SIC with Sharpe of 0.27 and 0.34 in the long and short case are performing 
marginally better than Historic with 0.24 and 0.32 in long and short case. The portfolio 
allocations are nearly the same for both portfolios in under the same restrictions, yet the minor 
difference in expected Sharpe ratios are driven by reduced noise in the covariance matrix.    
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Analysts are typically positively biased to pricing of stocks, i.e. earnings estimates. 
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Figure 22 – Efficient frontiers- Upper: Long only – Lower: Short 
 
Upper graph: illustration with restriction of shorting (Only Long). Lower graph: illustration when shorting is 
allowed. For all portfolios, the frontier starts at Minimum Variance portfolio. See Appendix 9 for the costs 
applied to short portfolio. For the short restricted portfolio, only transaction cost is applied with 0.02% 
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 Information ratio performance 
Since our base is an efficient investor according to CAPM, we relate to Treynor-Black model 
thoughts of optimal active investing combined with a passive portfolio. We measure risk-
adjusted level of stock picking by applying the IR with OSEBX as the tracking index. 
 
  In table 9, we find positive IR-ratios for all modeled portfolios, but only EY long and 
short are significant on 5% and 1% level22 and therefore statistically robust. EY produce highly 
competitive active risk-adjusted returns, as the high unsystematic risk is offset by an extremely 
high alpha. Goodwin (2008)23 view a monthly IR of 0.11 as above median performance, and IR 
above 0.19 and 0.32 within the 25th and 5th percentile. This places EY short and long in the top 
percentile. It places all the other portfolios above median, except Historic and SIC short 
strategy, which is expected to perform within the 25th percentile. Therefore we establish a weak 
form persistence of outperformance on a risk-adjusted basis as we find all IR’s above median 
threshold. The benchmark OSLENX obtains a negative IR of -0.20, which is within the 25th 
percentile of poorest performers. This result is mainly driven by Statoil obtaining negative risk-
adjusted α relative to OSEBX. 
Table 9 - Information Ratio. 
 
**Significant on 1 % level. *Significant on 5% level. OSEBX is the underlying benchmark and σεp is the 
unsystematic risk. To be consistent, we estimate ex-cost IR based on β approach as SIC and BL demand 
parametrically methods.  
 
We argue that expected performance based on ex ante figures is not reliable guidance 
for portfolio performance. Clark (2004) gives empirically support through his findings of in-
sample performance is weak and misleading for true future performance. We will in the 
                                                 
22 Significant values of IR current levels requires persistence over longer time than the data sample, as 𝑡 =
⁡𝐼𝑅𝑡⁡⁡√𝑇. 
23 We scale the Goodwin’s yearly IR ratios to monthly equivalents by the factor; 1
𝑇/√𝑇
   
Measure Historic SIC EY BL Historic SIC EY BL OSLENX OSEBX
SR 0.244 0.271 0.901 0.250 0.324 0.344 1.139 0.232 0.094 0.234
IR 0.125 0.171 0.898 0.171 0.255 0.273 1.141 0.131 -0.195
t(IR) 0.323 0.441 2.320* 0.441 0.659 0.705 2.947** 0.339 -0.503
α (%) 0.72 0.89 9.09 0.86 1.23 1.41 10.99 0.78 -0.626
β 1.365 1.283 0.987 0.890 0.795 0.918 0.654 0.939 0.899
σε (P) 0.058 0.052 0.101 0.050 0.048 0.052 0.096 0.059 0.032
BenhmarksLong Short
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following test our model performance under ex post environment, which recognizes true view- 
and modeling effort. 
5.5 Out-of-Sample Testing  
As we see in table 10, Sub-sector returns have evolved in a direction compliant with our sector 
views. Oil and subsea segments return 5% on average, seismic 3% and both supply and rig 
below 0%. Especially Panoro, Sevan Drilling and Farstad have large movements with 16%, -
13% and 10%, respectively. This has large impact on portfolio performance for BL, which has 
a bet on Panoro, and for EY, which is betting on Farstad. 
Table 10 - Out-of-sample monthly return and std.dev (01.09.2015-29.11.2010) 
 
Sharpe ratio performance  
 In table 11, we find low Sharpe ratios compared to the in-sample data set, which is due to 
increased variances as the oil price sensitivity have picked up. Moreover, the oil price has been 
highly volatile the last year. Ex-post portfolio return is on average higher than ex-ante 
emphasizing the large increase in risk when the net effect is negative for Sharpe ratios. OSEBX 
rose 2.41% a month, yielding a Sharpe of 0.22, which the modelled portfolios cannot compete 
with on a total risk level. Although it is clear distinction between EY and BL vs. Historic and 
SIC, affirming the poor forward-looking capabilities of the simple historic models. We see 
OSLENX yields the highest Sharpe, due to a Sharpe on Statoil of 0.26 and thus contradicting 
to both ex-ante performance and our fundamental valuation.  
Table 11 - Out-of-sample performance ratios (01.09.2015-29.11.2010) 
 
The ex-cost portfolio returns are calculated based on arithmetic log-returns on monthly basis and the standard 
deviations are based on daily returns and scaled according to 𝑆𝑑𝑇 = ⁡ 𝑆𝑑𝑡√𝑇. We apply the numeric version of 
IR (excess risk and return), as beta- estimated unsystematic risk in such short time frame become negative, due 
to sensitive betas. The grey shading mark parameters not directly used in estimation. 
STL DNO DETNOR PEN TGS PGS SPU SUBC AKER AKSO SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC OSLENX OSEBX
Return (%) 2.66 -2.30 5.61 16.27 2.05 7.46 -2.19 2.92 5.45 7.74 2.86 -4.30 3.71 -12.61 0.70 -2.93 -4.64 9.92 -3.19 2.60 2.41
std dev. 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.89 0.16 1.30 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.06
Measure Historic SIC EY BL Historic SIC EY BL OSLENX OSEBX
SR -0.044 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.018 0.025 0.134 0.106 0.257 0.222
IR 0.054 0.046 -0.405 0.233 -0.628 -0.088 0.128 0.038 0.011 -
t(IR) 0.027 0.023 -0.202 0.117 -0.314 -0.044 0.064 0.019 0.006 -
α (%) 0.032 0.030 0.000 0.042 -0.030 0.012 0.053 0.029 0.014
β 0.306 0.387 0.372 0.687 0.238 0.593 0.314 0.710 1.649
σ ε (P)2 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.011 -0.001 0.012
Long Short Benhmarks
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Information ratio performance 
Long BL is performing the best of all portfolios with an IR of 0.23 and are within the 25th 
percentile according to Goodwin. Optimizing both the prior and posterior BL distributions, we 
find the views highly impactful on information ratio, as we lose 0.10 in IR when optimizing the 
prior. Although, looking at out-of-sample equity performance is Panoro highly contributing to 
IR with low relative market capitalization of OSEBX and high unsystematic return. If only the 
view return, 𝑄 had been used, a greater fraction would be allocated to Panoro, as would increase 
performance. The reasoning for the actual allocation is the diversifying features of equilibrium 
return, Π, which reduce the expected return for Panoro, gives a lower allocation. 
Short EY portfolio are performing second best with an IR of 0.13 and thus above the 
median percentile in Goodwins ranking. Mainly due to high performance of Farstad and the 
small market capitalization of Farstad in OSEBX, yielding a relative large impact on the 
portfolio performance. Therefore we find average of analyst estimates of short term earnings 
are therefore good predictor in a static P/E framework of ex post performance of Farstad. And 
since the overall portfolio contributes with positive unsystematic return, the EY portfolio 
arrives at positive IR. This is evident for stock picking skill in our Norwegian-listed, oil-related 
investment universe. On the flipside, the static P/E model may be the wrong equilibrium model, 
as cash flow models are most common on oil-related companies. In addition, the assumption of 
zero present value of growth opportunities may be wrong from the market participant’s point 
of view. Both the latter imply Farstads performance is only luck and cannot be accredited to the 
model. This fact is backed by the poor performance of high allocation target, Sevan Drilling, 
which gives doubt to the model. Farstads performance can also be seen in a behavior or option-
like pricing context (low enterprise value-to-market capitalization), as it is not implausible to 
see a stock gain high percentage recovery in a short period of time after declining more than 
98% the past two years. 
Short Historic and -SIC models perform poor with IR’s of -0.42 and -0.09. Historic figures of 
returns contain a lot of noise, implying bad performance of average historic return vectors in 
optimization. We explain the finding with one expected part and one average error part in the 
return. Ex ante portfolios based on expected return and the average error part are outperformed 
by ex post portfolios, the true optimal allocation, only incorporating the expected part. As 
Historic and SIC contains both the expected part and the random part, they perform worst. This 
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is also evidential for the long BL and short EY portfolios lies closer to the ex post portfolio, as 
our modelling and valuation effort gain information that reduce the error part of ex post returns.   
5.6  Conclusion  
In the out-of-sample testing period Long Black-Litterman model perform a monthly 
information ratio of 0.23, which is within the 25th historic best percentile according to Goodwin. 
Moreover, the information ratio is mostly driven by the views based upon the equity valuations. 
Especially Panoro has a high portfolio weight, small relative market capitalization and large 
out-of-sample Sharpe ratio are driving portfolio performance. The Implied Earning Yield model 
has a monthly information ratio of 0.13 and therefore above the Goodwin’s median threshold 
of performance due to an extreme positive allocation to Farstad, in which is a high-performer 
in the out-of-sample period. Both the latter models beats the reference benchmark OSLENX on 
information ratio, therefore active management of a sub-portfolio in oil-related stocks on Oslo 
Stock Exchange generate excess return net of costs for an efficient and marginal investor. Our 
information ratio results are mainly driven by high relative weight in Statoil in the index. 
OSLENX gets outperformed with a monthly information ratio of 0.01, but the monthly Sharpe 
ratio of 0.27 is superior to all portfolios. The large Sharpe is mainly driven by the same reason 
as the low information ratio, the large fraction Statoil in the peer-index as well as in OSEBX. 
By constraining the portfolio optimization to actively deviate from peer benchmark OSLENX 
with restrictions on Statoil. We produce higher information ratio criteria than a passive peer 
index strategy, but it costs us reduced Sharpe ratio. We emphasize that the index is although 
more expensive to replicate in the market than we stipulate in our analysis.   
5.7  Limitations  
The most obvious limitation for our result is the length of the out-of-sample testing period. With 
three months, fundamental valuations may not materialize and the corresponding performance 
results can relate to noise and luck, and not persistency. For the Black-Litterman framework, 
the implied cost of equity backed out from discounted cash flow models is the basis for view 
vector, therefore the estimates are more of a long term character, which may imply the three 
month out-sample period is containing a lot of noise. In the next section, we extend our analysis 
to incorporate non-normal equity returns, as the normal distribution is a rigid assumption to 
make when we found some fat tails and asymmetry in the in-sample period of data.  
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6. Extensions  
Copula Opinion Pooling (“COP”) methodology is an appropriate framework incorporating non-
normal properties of equity distributions (Meucci, 2006, 2008). The framework does also model 
crisis correlation, extreme event co-movements with copulas, which is not captured by simple 
parametric modeling. In sum, the output from the COP framework demands an optimization 
framework, which account for asymmetries and multivariate dependencies. Therefore, we 
introduce an optimizer with Conditional Value at Risk (“CVaR”) objectives. Firstly, we discuss 
the applicable theory, and then we analyze the results. Lastly, we use Out-of-Sample testing to 
test performance in a forward-looking matter. 
6.1 Executive Summary – CVaR preferences  
An investor represented with CVaR preferences should according to the forthcoming findings 
hold the market portfolio, thus the modeling effort is unnecessary to generate the highest risk-
adjusted return. Therefore, optimal bets are not present in oil-related stocks when the investor 
has CVaR preferences. The reasoning follows the cross-dependencies between the equities, 
modeled with Copulas, is less dominating than when correlation is the measure of 
dependencies. In combination with the potential to offset CVaR against other equities disappear 
in a portfolio where the equities is exogenously connected through the oil price makes OSEBX 
a better investment due to larger sample of stocks with offsetting extreme tail occurrences. 
6.2 Theory 
6.2.1 Mean-CVaR Optimization and Conditional Sharpe-Ratio 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (“CVaR”) is a conservative and coherent risk measure focusing on 
the tail loss of returns strictly exceeding the threshold of VaR25. A general definition of CVaR 
gives a lot of intuition; “CVaR is the expected loss during an N-day period, conditional that 
the loss is greater than the pth percentile of the loss distribution”. In this thesis N=20 (a month 
of trading days) and p is 95%, then CVaR is the average expected loss of a month, assuming 
                                                 
25 Value-at-Risk is defined as the largest loss likely over a holding period T with a given confidence level. 
 
 70 
 
the loss is among the 5 % largest in the loss distribution. We can formally express it as according 
to Acerbi and Tasche (2002) 
𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑝)(𝑋) = ⁡
1
𝑝
⁡⁡∫ inf⁡{𝑥|𝐹(𝑥) ≥ 𝑝}⁡𝑑𝑝
𝑝
0
     (6.1) 
where inf⁡{𝑦|𝐹(𝑦) ≥ 𝑝}⁡is the quantile function of⁡𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥).  
We optimize portfolios in a Mean-CVaR (“MC”) framework using linear programming 
on the following minimization problem (Uryasev, 2000).  
min
P
⁡𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑝(𝑃)      (6.2) 
𝑠. 𝑡.⁡⁡ ∑ 𝑤𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 = 1, 𝑤
𝑇𝜇 ≥ 𝑟, 𝐴𝑥 <=> 𝑏⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡       
Where P is the total portfolio, 𝑤 is the relative weight in Nth equity. The first constrain 
denoting the aggregated weights must sum to 1, second constrain says that portfolio return must 
be equal or larger than a threshold, 𝑟. The third constraint is a general constrain equivalent to 
the one in BL and can be selected as desired. We will apply equivalent constraints as in the MV 
framework. The minimization formulation has no closed-end solution, yet it can be interpreted 
by a more intuitive maximization problem. We maximize the Conditional Value at Risk 
(“CSR”) for the set of assets. According to, Argawal and Naik (2004), CSR measures the left-
tail risk-adjusted excess return of the return distributions and is a measure to evaluate 
performance of equity- and portfolio performance in a MC framework. 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖−𝑟𝑓
𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖
            (6.3) 
6.2.2 Copula Opinion Pooling  
The COP approach provides a posterior market distribution, which smoothly blends an 
arbitrarily distributed prior market distribution with arbitrarily chosen views. The method relies 
on a large number of Monte Carlo simulations, in which the user has to be willing to accept no 
closed end result. Muecci (2006) made the views dependent on “realizations of the market”, not 
on estimated market equilibrium parameters as in the original formulation of BL.  
Prior Market Distribution 
The starting point for the COP is a multivariate market (M), which is an 𝐷 X 𝑁 matrix of log-
returns and from M, we can define a probability density function (pdf) to represent the prior 
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market. We will make use of Azzalini and Capitanio (2003) skewed multivariate t-distribution 
function 
𝑓𝑌(𝑌) = 2𝑡𝑑(𝑦; 𝑣)𝑇1 (𝛼𝑇𝜔−1(𝑦 − 𝜉) (
𝑣+𝑑
𝑄𝑦+𝑣
)
1/2
; 𝑣 + 𝑑)               (6.4) 
where 𝜉 is the expected return, 𝛼 is a shape parameter regulating the slant of the distribution 
and 𝜔 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑤11, … , 𝜔𝑑𝑑)1/2 of 𝑁 X 𝑁 dispersion matrix⁡𝛺,  
𝑄𝑦 = (𝑦 − ⁡𝜉)𝑇𝛺−1(𝑦 − ⁡𝜉),⁡ 
𝑡𝑑(𝑦; 𝑣) =
1
|𝛺|1/2
𝑔𝑑(𝑄𝑦; 𝑣) = ⁡
Г(
𝑣 + 𝑑
2 )⁡
⁡|𝛺|1/2(𝜋𝑑)𝑑/2Г(
𝑣
2)
(1 +
𝑄𝑦
𝑣
)
−(𝑣+𝑑)/2 
 
is the density function of 𝑁-dimensial t variate with v degrees of freedom and where 𝑇1(𝑥; 𝑣 +
𝑑) state the scalar t distribution with 𝑣 + 𝑑 degrees of freedom. Convenient features of the 
skewed T is when 𝜑⁡ → ⁡∞, i.e. the distribution converges to a skewed normal distribution, 
when 𝛼 = 0 the distribution becomes a regular Student-T and when 𝜑  decrease it is more 
plausible to have tail observations i.e. a leptokurtic shape.  
The parameters are estimated by maximum-likelihood estimation and a rearrangement 
of (7.4) is necessary for estimation. We can represent the pdf as 
𝑀~𝑆𝑘𝑇(𝜉, 𝛺, 𝛼, 𝜑)⁡     (6.5) 
Let 𝜉𝑖 = ⁡𝛽⁡𝑇𝑥𝑖, for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐷, 𝑥𝑖 be a 𝐾 dimensional vector and 𝛽 is a 𝐾 X 𝐷 matrix 
of parameters. Furthermore, the model assume ⁡𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝐷)𝑇  to be a 𝐾  X 𝐷  design 
matrix. Effectively, we can now write 
𝛺−1 = 𝐴𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑒−2𝜌)𝐴 = 𝐴𝑇𝐷𝐴,  𝜂 = ⁡𝜔−1𝛼 
where 𝐴 is an upper triangular 𝑁 X 𝑁 matrix with diagonals of 1 and 𝜌⁡ ∈ ⁡ℝ𝑑. The log-
likelihood function for 𝜃 = (⁡𝛽, 𝐴, 𝜌, 𝜂, log 𝑣)⁡is then given by 
ℓ(𝜃) = ⁡∑ [log 2 +⁡
1
2
log|𝐷| + log 𝑔𝑑(𝑄𝑖; 𝑣) + log 𝑇1(𝑡(𝐿𝑖, 𝑄𝑖, 𝑣); 𝑣 + 𝑑)]
𝑛
𝑖=1  ,        (6.6) 
where,  
𝑢𝑖 = ⁡𝑦𝑖 −⁡𝛽⁡𝑇𝑥𝑖, 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖𝑇⁡𝛺−1𝑢𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 = 𝛼𝑇𝜔⁡−1𝑢𝑖, 𝑡(𝐿, 𝑄, 𝑣) = 𝐿 (
𝑣+𝑑
𝑄+𝑣
)
1/2
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We denote the prior cumulative distribution (cdf) function as⁡𝐹𝑘(𝑣) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟{𝑉𝑘 < 𝑣},
𝑘 = 1,… . 𝐾. 
Views 
As in the BL framework, the kth view Q, are expressed in a linear matter and the practitioner 
can vary their views between relative and absolute views depending on opinion. The views are 
accompanied with a pick matrix (P), which dictates a theoretical upper limit of K views equal 
to N equities. The view-adjusted market can now be defined as an N-dimensional vector 
𝑉 ≡ 𝑃𝑀     (6.7) 
A K X N matrix, where only the kth first columns of V are statements on market-implied 
views now represents V. The cdf of kth view is therefore; ?̂?𝑘(𝑣) ≡ 𝑃𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠{𝑉𝑘 < 𝑣}, 𝑘 =
1, … . 𝐾. In general, any distribution can be fitted, although only uniform distributed will be 
considered in this thesis. The multivariate normal case as in the BL framework is rather good, 
because it is unlikely to have an investor defining a stochastic set of estimates. Therefore, a 
univariate representation is a favorable choice, as an investor is more likely to set a target return 
range on the equities. 
Posterior Market Distribution 
To solve the dichotomy of the prior and the view distribution, we firstly determine the posterior 
function of each view individually by using opinion-pooling techniques, and then we determine 
the joint posterior distribution of the views by drawing knowledge of the dependence structures 
from the market prior. Lastly, we calculate the joint posterior distribution of the market by 
including the view distribution in a suitable set of market co-ordinates. The posterior marginal 
pdf of the kth view is a weighted average of the prior market pdf and the subjective pdf of each 
view. 
 ?̃?𝑘(𝑣) ≡ 𝑐𝑘?̂?𝑘 + (1 − 𝑐𝑘)𝐹𝑘⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾   (6.8) 
Where 𝑐𝑘⁡ ∈ (0,1) is the confidence level of the views. An interpretation can be given 
in relation to the BL framework as the inverse uncertainty in the view estimate. The joint 
distribution of each view is determined from Sklar’s Theorem (7.10) and (7.11), where the 
posterior joint distribution can be written in terms of the marginal posterior distribution and 
dependency structures in market returns, called copula. Copulas model complex non-linear 
relationship between the equities, which simple correlations cannot capture. Consider a random 
vector(𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑘). The copula C is the joint cumulative distribution of (𝑈1,… , 𝑈𝑘), which has 
 73 
 
uniformly distributed marginals, 𝑈𝑗 ∈ (0,1). We can then write it as⁡𝐶(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑘) = ⁡𝑃(𝑈1 ≤
𝑢1,… , 𝑈𝑘 ≤ 𝑢𝑘). In this thesis, we make use of t-distributed copulas because this allows for 
joint fat tails and higher probability of joint extreme events than normal copula. The t-copula 
can be written 
𝐶𝜌,𝑣(𝑢, 𝑣) = ⁡∫ ∫
1
2𝜋(1−⁡𝜌2)0.5
𝑡𝑣−1
−∞
𝑡𝑣−1(𝑢)
−∞
{1 +⁡
𝑋2−2𝜌𝑥𝑦⁡+⁡𝑦2⁡
𝑣(1−⁡𝜌2⁡)
}
−(𝑣+2)/2
𝑑𝑠⁡𝑑𝑡⁡   (6.9) 
where 𝜌⁡and v  are parameters of the copula and 𝑡𝑣−1  is the inverse standard univariate t-
distribution with 𝑣  degress of freedom, expectation 0 and variance, 𝑣
𝑣−2
. The copula of the 
posterior distribution is inherited from the prior. 
𝐶⁡ ≡ (
𝐶1
⋮
𝐶𝐾
) = ⁡(
𝐹1(𝑉1)
⋮
𝐹𝐾⁡(𝑉𝐾)
)     (6.10) 
Therefore can we express the posterior joint distribution of the views by means of 
?̃? ⁡≡ (
?̃?1
⋮
?̃?𝐾
) = ⁡(
𝐹1⁡̃
−1
(𝐶1)
⋮
𝐹𝐾⁡̃
−1
(𝐶𝐾)
)     (6.11) 
where 𝐹𝑘⁡̃
−1 is the quantile function relative to the cdf,⁡𝐹𝐾⁡̃ .The method leverage from a linear 
interpolator function to transform 𝐶  back to the posterior empirical distribution of ⁡𝑉𝐾, ?̃?𝐾 . 
Finally, we can determine the posterior market distribution⁡(?̃?), where K first entries of ?̃?are 
the posterior distribution in (7.11) and the rest are equal to the prior. 
?̃? = ⁡⁡ 𝑃−1?̃?      (6.12) 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Distributional modeling – Copula Opinion Pooling 
Views  
We model the views, 𝑉 based on a univariate model distribution, where we allow the target 
price to range plus-minus 20% to account for variability in the estimates. We further set the 
confidence, 𝑐𝑘based on a study done by CXO Advisory Group (2012) on the hit-ratio of equity 
 74 
 
market experts26. According to the study, the median-quartile hit ratio is between 44% and 52%. 
We settle with a 𝑐𝑘 of 44%, in the low end of the median-quartile, because we recognize the 
skill set and the long-run experience of the experts analyzed in the study.  
From Prior to Posterior 
The modeling of copula,⁡𝐶 of the flexible skew-t distribution, preserves the tail-risk properties 
inherent in the prior market distributions⁡𝑀, to the posterior market distributions, ?̃?. Although, 
imposing the univariate view structure 𝑉, will make the posterior different from the prior with 
changes mainly around the mean,⁡𝜉 of the equities as we can see in figure 23. 
Figure 23 – Probability density function of COP prior and posterior 
Red line; Prior distributions (𝑀); constructed on the parameters of the Skew-T distribution. Blue line; Posterior 
distributions (𝑀⁡̃); modeled on the prior T-Skewed distributions blended with the univariate view distributions. 
The distributions are modeled with monthly data, 
                                                 
26 The study is based on 6,582 forecast in the U.S equity market from 68 equity experts in the period from late 
1998 to 2012. 
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We analyze Seadrill to exemplify the process. We see know that view cdf,⁡?̂?𝑘 impose 
change to the posterior cdf, ?̃?𝑘  by observing the changed around the mean from 𝑀 to 𝑀⁡̃ in 
figure 24. The univariate structure of ?̂?𝑘  increase the probability that the expected return is 
around mean of distributions. In sum, 𝑀⁡̃has taken a leptokurtic shape and the minor left-
skewed profile is still intact due to the implementation of 𝐶⁡to 𝑀⁡̃.  
Figure 24 –COP Probability density function of COP prior and posterior –Seadrill 
 
We examine 𝐶 of 𝑀⁡and 𝑀⁡̃ to assure correct application of the framework. According 
to figure 25, Seadrill has the same structure of dependencies against Subsea 7 in 𝑀⁡and 𝑀⁡̃. The 
same holds for Spectrum and Solstad Offshore. The modeling of 𝐶 holds for all equity inter-
relations. 
Figure 25 –COP prior and posterior copulas  
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The correlation structure has changed substantial from the Historic and BL matrices 
after we fitted the t-copulas to the posterior distribution. It is smoothed out and negative 
correlations are almost gone. This costs us 5.57 degrees of freedom, however since we are able 
to leverage from the copula patterns in the posterior distribution we are willing to carry the cost 
of degrees of freedom. The reduction in correlations is mainly due to normal distribution 
exaggerate the impact of extreme events and thus increase absolute correlation. We find the 
reduction in negative correlation is evidential for our hypothesis of the common directional risk 
factor in the oil price, as extreme positive movements are driving correlations positively. See 
Appendix 12 for the posterior correlation matrix.  
6.3.2 CVaR Portfolio Allocations 
We have to model CVaR values of SIC, EY and BL parametrically27, since we do not have 
either historic data or know the true distributions of the models. In sum, this implies CVaR 
optimal portfolio weights are equal to weights from the MV framework (Xiong, 2010). We use 
historic data to calculate Historic CVaR and bootstrapped COP-realizations to calculate the 
CVaR of the COP model. See equity CSR’s and portfolio allocations in table 12 and 13. 
Consistently for all portfolios and benchmarks, we use a CVaR confidence-level of 95%. 
Historic - MV-preferences versus MC-preferences  
Considering changes from the MV framework of the Historic model, TGS’ get reduced weight 
to allocate a fraction to Spectrum. Aker gets increased allocation when shorting is considered, 
and vice versa, which is due to possibility to exploit dependencies across the equities. Also Fred 
Olsen Energy gets increased allocations in the short case. The changes are mainly due to the 
objective of the MC optimizer, as MC favors positively skewed and thin-tailed assets, while the 
MV framework ignores the information from skewness and kurtosis.  
Oil - low tail risk increase attractiveness in COP  
We observe COP allocate by far the most towards oil with over 55% and 71% in long and short 
portfolios, respectively, which is primarily due to low tail risk of Statoil, Det Norske 
Oljeselskap and Panoro compared to other assets. This is in line with the fact that smoothened 
COP correlations on general basis drive allocation depending more on each equity’s CSRs, 
                                                 
27  RiskMetrics (1996) introduced a method of calculating CVaR based mean and standard deviation. 
Yielding−𝜇 + ⁡𝜎 𝑛(𝑧)
1−𝑝
, where 𝑛(𝑧)the value of the standard normal density function is evaluated in 𝑧 and 𝑝 is the 
percentile. 
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although we emphasize the lower tails are the objective, thus giving limited interpretation of 
the dependencies. Statoil binds the 40% constrain, which means increased allocations would 
increase portfolio CSR. Moreover, the increased allocation to Statoil further violates our sell 
recommendation on the stock.  
 Seismic - TGS has favorable interdependency structure with other assets 
COP has high allocation to seismic compared to BL, but not compared to the rest of the models. 
In the long only case, the interest in TGS vanish due to lack of possibilities to offset some of 
the dependency driven CVaR risks TGS produce with other equities on portfolio level. 
Consequently, the allocation to TGS violets our sell recommendation and we find the allocation 
in the short strategy a breach to our view on the stock. 
Drilling - less favorable judged by tail risk  
In comparison with the BL framework, COP are more in line with the sell recommendation on 
the drilling sector with net allocation of 0% and 8.50%, long and short, respectively. We see all 
drilling equities less favorable judged by tail risk. This has mainly to do with high sensitivity 
to oil price, as exploring drilling services are cut back early under E&P spending. Moreover, 
we note the returns for Songa Offshore and Fred Olsen Energy are negative, thus negative CSR. 
This is due to the posterior mean properties of ?̃?⁡is made on negative prior expected return,⁡𝜉 
and negative recommendation on stocks materializes into low 𝑉on the stocks. 
Supply - exploiting high dependency structures  
COP has the highest short allocation to supply of all the models and a zero-allocation in the 
long only case driven by negative expected returns of ?̃?⁡on Siem Offshore, Farstad and Deep 
Sea Supply. Solstad Offshore is attractive under short strategy, as it is possible to exploit 
dependency structures. Although the CSR is only 0.01, allocation is 32.80%, 18.7% higher than 
in the BL framework. This reinforces the statement of dependencies in the returns within 
supply. As we see in figure 26, there are substantial positive co-dependencies between the return 
structure of Solstad Offshore and the other supply companies especially in the lower tail, which 
is the objective of the optimizer to minimize. This is mainly due to Supply is a homogeny and 
low entry barrier sub-sector driven by a generic rate level. 
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Figure 26 – COP- Solstad Offshore vs. supply – posterior copulas 
 
Table 12 –Conditional Sharpe ratio of Modeled Equities 
 
*CVaR of OSEBX and OSLENX are estimated non-parametric. The CSR’s are consistently built on CVaR at 95th 
percentile and yields the expected excess return per % of the investment we on average loose in the 5% worst 
monthly losses. 
Company Historic SIC EY BL COP Weight(%)
Oil
Statoil (STL) 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.07 75.66
DNO International (DNO) -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 1.92
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 1.86
Panoro Energy (PEN) -0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.03
Weighted Average 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.06 79.47
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.05 3.09
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.01 1.35
Spectrum (SPU) 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.31
Weighted Average 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 4.75
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 4.43
Aker ASA (AKER) 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.09 2.21
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.67
Weighted Average 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.04 8.31
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.05 5.29
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) -0.05 -0.05 0.14 0.05 -0.02 0.50
Songa Offshore (SONG) -0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.17
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) -0.05 -0.11 0.52 0.08 0.02 0.05
Weighted Average -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.04 6.01
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 1.04
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) -0.06 -0.10 0.16 0.05 -0.02 0.30
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) -0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.19
Farstad Shipping (FAR) -0.02 -0.01 0.44 0.05 -0.02 0.13
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.11
Weighted Average 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.01 1.77
Total Weighted Average 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.06 100
OSLENX 0.03
OSEBX* 0.12
Conditional Sharpe Ratio
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Table 13 –Mean-CVaR optimized portfolio weights 
 
*Rec. is our recommendation given for each of the assets. The weights are given in percentages and grey columns 
mark that portfolio weights are equal to MV-case.  
6.3.3 CVaR Portfolio Performance  
In-sample performance  
As we see in figure 27, long COP performs the worst with a CSR of 0.11, marginally worse 
than OSEBX. However, this is a natural consequence of the modeling features of COP, as it 
incorporates fat tails and extreme dependencies between the equities. Historic follows with 
0.14, which reinforces the non-parametric of COP. BL is also performing at 0.14 and SIC are 
performing marginally better with 0.15. Similarly, as in the MV framework, EY performs best. 
This holds also for the short case, where BL is performing worst, followed by COP, SIC and 
Historic. The active index OSLENX is performing the worst of all, mainly due to high CVaR 
risk. We emphasize this is not driven by the mean, as Statoil return is high and the relative 
Company Historic SIC EY BL COP Historic SIC EY BL COP Rec.*
Oil
Statoil (STL) -           27.39       35.20       40.00          40.00       40.00       37.78       40.00       Sell
DNO International (DNO) 0.64         -           1.29            -1.59        5.38         -1.84        2.54         Neutral
Det Norske Oljeselskap (DETNOR) 0.70              9.95         -           14.36          0.82         0.62         -1.41        18.10       Buy
Panoro Energy (PEN) 22.70       20.06       -12.89         -8.15        -13.09      26.24       11.06       Buy
Sum 0.70              10.59       50.09       55.26       42.76          31.09       32.90       60.76       71.70       
Seismic
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical (TGS) 67.46            47.06       -           53.93          29.43       37.61       -11.22      21.58       Sell
Petroleum Geo-services (PGS) -           -25.63         -9.10        5.70         -8.08        -4.98        Sell
Spectrum (SPU) 0.58              2.35         9.38         4.23            4.37         8.58         Sell
Sum 68.04            49.41       9.38         32.53          24.70       43.31       -19.30      25.17       
Subsea
Subsea 7 (SUBC) 3.97         -4.14           3.80         -50.34      2.63         -2.69        Neutral
Aker ASA (AKER) 26.65            33.44       16.45       35.36       25.05          30.40       2.16         25.18       23.19       Buy
Aker Solutions (AKSO) 4.60              2.03         1.60            2.04         5.77         -1.60        -9.80        Sell
Sum 31.26            39.44       16.45       35.36       22.51          36.24       -42.41      26.21       10.70       
Drilling
Seadrill (SDRL) 4.11         -4.38           -2.55        -31.22      14.59       8.72         Sell
Fred Olsen Energy (FOE) 7.25         9.13            8.76         0.66         5.61         0.66         Sell
Songa Offshore (SONG) 7.10         0.49            -0.63        4.87         7.05         -0.88        Sell
Sevan Drilling (SEVDR) 39.13       5.74         -              26.16       11.44       -           Sell
Sum 39.13       24.20       5.24            5.57         0.46         38.69       8.50         
Supply
Prosafe (PRS) 11.15       0.98         5.11            13.36       -8.64        3.81         -3.71        Sell
Siem Offshore (SIOFF) 3.99         -3.33           -13.36      6.67         -8.77        -16.23      Neutral
Solstad Offshore (SOFF) 8.28         13.85          5.74         -18.28      14.09       32.80       Neutral
Farstad Shipping (FAR) 46.28       -5.35           0.26         99.94       -12.33      -13.78      Neutral
Deep Sea Supply (DESSC) -13.32         -3.59        -13.95      -3.16        -15.15      Buy
Sum 11.15       50.28       9.26         -3.04           2.40         65.74       -6.35        -16.08      
Only Long Short
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proportion of Statoil in the index is high, but the remaining 10% of equities are increasing CVaR 
substantial. This finding has parity with the CVaRs found on analyzed equities. The argument 
from MV- framework of negative return impacting Historic and SIC Short portfolio 
performance positive holds up here as well, as the copulas are not turning the inter-relations 
upside down. Ex ante evaluation is not necessarily the most appropriate environment to test the 
portfolio performance, thus we will evaluate in ex-post environment where our valuation- and 
modeling effort is incorporated. 
Figure 27 –Mean-CVaR efficient frontiers - Upper: Long only – Lower: Short 
 
Upper graph: illustration with restriction of shorting (Only Long). Lower graph: illustration of no restrictions on 
shorting. For all portfolios, the frontier starts at Minimum CVaR portfolio. See Appendix 9 for the costs applied 
to short portfolio. For the short restricted portfolio only transaction cost is applied with 0.02% 
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Out-of-sample performance 
Equivalent to the MV-framework, the benchmarks are performing best on absolute risk-
adjusted measures out-of-sample. The ranking order has changed from MV-framework, as 
OSEBX are superior to OSLENX, with 0.02. This is mainly due to CVaR only capture the 
downside risk in a distribution compared to standard deviation which incorporate both up- and 
downside risk. Thus, risk factors in MV-framework are being underestimated due to overriding 
small upside risk compared to downside risk in a two-sided distribution measure as standard 
deviation. We therefore find larger down side risk in peer index, OSLENX than the market 
index, OSEBX, which is a plausible finding due to offsetting copula of sectors. To exemplify, 
E&P and shipping has an offsetting relationship, due to inverse sensitivity to oil price. 
Table 14 – In and Out-of-sample testing (01.09.2015-29.11.2010), CSR 
 
The ex-cost portfolio and benchmark returns are calculated on arithmetic log-returns on monthly basis and CVaRs 
are estimated based on on daily returns and scaled using 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑇 = ⁡ 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡√𝑇. Refer to Appendix 11 for monthly 
out-of-sample equity returns and CVaRs. 
CVaR for all stocks have increased substantially from the in-sample-period and Statoil 
is the least impacted stock, which is decisive for OSLENX performance, thus beat the portfolios 
with large margin. Of all the portfolios, COP is performing overall best in the short-restricted 
case with a CSR of 0.049, but other portfolios are better than COP short strategy portfolio 
yielding a negative risk-adjusted return of -0.001. We note that EY yield performs second best 
with 0.047 and Short Historic and SIC, in addition to Long EY are performing poor. The latter 
are emphasizing the findings from MV-framework.  
 
Since none of the portfolios CSR’s can compete with the full-diversified index-portfolio 
OSEBX, we settle with that the most favourable investment is done in OSEBX according to 
tail-risk considerations. 
 
Measure Historic SIC EY BL COP Historic SIC EY BL COP OSLENX OSEBX
In-Sample 0.147 0.155 0.772 0.147 0.112 0.215 0.207 1.358 0.131 0.158 0.028 0.131
Out-of-Samle 0.019 0.021 -0.023 0.019 0.049 -0.024 0.002 0.047 0.002 -0.001 0.151 0.173
Long Short Benhmarks
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8. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Historic Correlation Matrix 
 
Extreme values are bold 
Appendix 2: Efficient Frontier, MPT Assumptions and Further Insight 
 
MPT was founded on the assumption that investors are price takers with rational behavior and 
make investments based on homogenous expectations based on the same information regarding 
risky assets’ expected return and variance, which follows the normal distribution. Correlations 
and variances are known, there are no taxes or transaction costs and all securities are indefinitely 
diversifiable. Further, can an investor lend and borrow money freely (Markowitz, 1952). The 
efficient set of portfolios is then the portfolios, which either maximize expected return for given 
level of risk or minimize risk for a given level of return, in the investment opportunity set of 
attainable portfolio (Wei J., 2003). Secondly, the efficient frontier is then being combined with 
Historic SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR SUBC AKER AKSO TGS PGS SPU STL DNO DETNOR PEN PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC
SDRL 1.00 0.35 0.17 0.44 0.35 0.53 0.17 0.50 0.35 0.22 0.55 0.20 0.13 0.51 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.38
FOE 1.00 -0.09 0.32 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.31 0.08
SONG 1.00 0.05 0.10 0.13 -0.12 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05
SEVDR 1.00 0.11 0.45 0.13 0.15 0.50 -0.03 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.17 0.54 0.31 0.21 0.18
SUBC 1.00 0.18 0.16 0.73 -0.07 0.68 0.22 -0.43 -0.60 0.10 0.72 -0.31 0.50 0.79 0.59
AKER 1.00 0.27 0.44 0.49 0.11 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.15 0.28
AKSO 1.00 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.01 0.27 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.22
TGS 1.00 0.23 0.58 0.34 -0.18 -0.37 0.26 0.56 -0.15 0.39 0.57 0.53
PGS 1.00 -0.14 0.42 0.59 0.41 0.24 -0.01 0.56 0.03 -0.16 -0.06
SPU 1.00 0.19 -0.39 -0.50 0.09 0.57 -0.33 0.31 0.61 0.34
STL 1.00 0.29 0.32 0.42 0.30 0.39 0.17 0.24 0.21
DNO 1.00 0.29 0.32 0.42 -0.30 0.61 -0.28 -0.47 -0.30
DETNOR 1.00 0.21 -0.41 0.67 -0.40 -0.52 -0.36
PEN 1.00 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.21 0.15
PRS 1.00 -0.23 0.61 0.73 0.48
SIOFF 1.00 -0.06 -0.22 -0.12
SOFF 1.00 0.70 0.59
FAR 1.00 0.64
DESSC 1.00
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the investor’s utility function to find investors optimal portfolio dependent on the degree of risk 
aversion. It fosters the Tangency portfolio, which combined with the Capital Market Line yield 
a superior risk-return trade off as seen in the illustration above. The slope of Capital Market 
Line is called the Sharp ratio.  
 
Appendix 3: Proof of BL-Formula 
 
Below follows derivation of BL formula from Christodoulakis, G.A. (2002) Applying Bayes 
rule to extract the conditional probability distribution of equilibrium returns given the expected 
returns can be represented 
 
Pr(µ|𝛱) = ⁡
Pr(𝛱|µ) Pr⁡(µ)
Pr⁡(µ)
⁡ 
We will further assume prior beliefs in Pr(µ) can be expressed with the vector K x 1 µ multiplied 
with K x N matrix P.  
𝑃⁡µ = 𝑄 + ⁡𝜀,  
Where 𝑄 and 𝜀 are equivalent with (3.19), therefore know that 
𝑃⁡µ⁡~𝑁(𝑄, 𝛺) 
The conditional expected returns given by⁡𝛱|µ are expected to be 
⁡⁡𝛱|µ⁡~𝑁(µ, 𝛴)   
From the sketched distributions can we now create pdf 
𝑝𝑑𝑓(𝑃µ) = ⁡
1
√2𝛼𝑘|𝛺|
⁡exp⁡(−
1
2
(𝑃µ − 𝑄)𝑇𝛺−1(𝑃µ − 𝑄)) 
𝑝𝑑𝑓(𝛱|µ) = ⁡
1
√2𝛼𝑘|𝜏𝛴|
exp(−
1
2
(𝛱 − µ)𝑇(𝜏𝛴)−1(𝛱 − µ)) 
Substituting the posterior probability density function using Bayes theorem will give us 
exp⁡(−
1
2
(𝛱 − µ)𝑇(𝜏𝛴)−1(𝛱 − µ) −
1
2
(𝑃µ − 𝑄)𝑇𝛺−1(𝑃µ − 𝑄)) 
Which can be written as 
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exp(−
1
2
(⁡µ𝑇𝐻µ − 2𝐶𝑇µ + 𝐴)) 
= exp (−
1
2
(⁡µ𝑇𝐻𝑇𝐻𝐻−1⁡µ − 2𝐶𝑇𝐻−1𝐻µ + 𝐴)) 
= exp (−
1
2
[(𝐻µ − 𝐶)𝑇⁡𝐻−1(𝐻µ − 𝐶) −⁡𝐶𝑇𝐻−1𝐶 + 𝐴)) 
= exp (−
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝐶𝑇𝐻−1⁡𝐶)) ⁡𝑥⁡ exp (−
1
2
(𝐻µ − 𝐶)𝑇⁡𝐻−1(𝐻µ − 𝐶)) 
where, 
𝐻 =⁡ (𝜏𝛴)−1𝑃𝑇𝛺−1𝑃  
⁡𝐶 = ⁡ (𝜏𝛴)−1𝛱 +⁡𝑃𝑇𝛺−1𝑄      
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 = 𝛱𝑇⁡(𝜏𝛴)−1𝛱 +⁡𝑄𝑇𝛺−1𝑄  
Thus, The term exp (− 1
2
(𝐴 − 𝐶𝑇𝐻−1⁡𝐶)) and the denominator pdf (𝛱) which is not modelled 
will be absorbed into an integrating constant for the posterior pdf. Hence the results follow, 
𝜇𝐵𝐿 = 𝐻−1𝐶 = ⁡𝛱 + 𝛴𝑃𝑇((𝑃𝛴𝑃𝑇) + ⁡𝛺⁡⁡)
−1
(𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝛱)   (3.1) 
 𝜎𝐵𝐿 ⁡⁡= 𝐻−1 = ⁡𝛴 +⁡(𝜏𝛴)−1𝑃𝑇𝛺−1𝑃⁡,    (3.2) 
that can easily be shown to be an alternate formula of the following.  See Walters J. (2014)  
𝜇𝐵𝐿 ⁡= ⁡ [(𝜏𝛴)−1 + 𝑃𝑇⁡𝛺−1𝑃⁡]−1⁡[(𝜏𝛴)−1𝛱 +⁡𝑃𝑇𝛺−1⁡𝑄]  (3.3) 
𝛴𝐵𝐿 ⁡⁡= ⁡ [(𝜏𝛴)−1 + 𝑃𝑇⁡𝛺−1𝑃⁡]−1     (3.4) 
 
Appendix 4: Oil Demand Growth 
 
 
 
Oil Demand Growth (Million bpd) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Americas 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0
Europe 0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Asia Oceania 0.2 0 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 0
Total OECD 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.6 0 0 0 -0.2 -0.2
FSU 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
china 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other Asia 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Latin America 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Middle East 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Africa 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total Non-OECD 2.3 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
World 2.9 0.6 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
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Appendix 5: Oil Supply Growth 
 
 
Appendix 6: Physical Oil Market Equilibrium 
 
 
Appendix 7: Detailed Oil Service Market Overview 
 
Non-OPEC Supply Growth 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Russia 240 150 130 150 110 110 -90 -340 -40 -100 -80
Africa -50 90 -330 60 50 -40 -50 190 -50 -60 -120
Norway -260 -100 -130 -70 50 30 -70 -80 -10 -40 -20
China 210 0 70 10 40 100 -110 -30 0 30 80
Brazil 110 60 -40 -40 230 220 100 200 160 110 70
Canada 130 180 220 240 270 100 140 -60 130 150 250
USA 330 370 140 1 140 1 720 790 -190 500 310 290 300
Other FSU 40 -130 -40 70 -50 -20 -110 0 30 150 10
Mexico -20 -20 -20 -30 -80 -210 -70 80 0 60 120
UK -120 -240 -180 -90 -20 60 -40 -60 10 -10 0
Global biofuels 300 -30 -10 150 180 120 40 -30 40 20 30
Other 160 -150 -130 -250 -90 -20 -60 120 120 -40 -160
Total Non-OPEC 1 070 180 580 1 340 2 410 1 240 -510 490 700 560 480
OPEC Capacity Growth 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Saudi Arabia -5 1 180 425 -203 120 -40 80 70 -30 -50 -20
Iran -40 -80 -620 -318 540 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iraq -70 310 280 126 400 240 200 120 110 190 210
UAE 40 190 150 64 30 40 40 50 70 50 60
Kuwait 15 240 195 52 -20 -40 20 0 -10 -30 -40
Watar 0 0 0 -9 -10 -30 0 10 10 10 0
Angola 0 -90 120 0 -110 30 0 40 20 0 0
Nigeria 260 100 -80 -145 -330 -60 -10 -10 -10 0 0
Libyia 0 -1 090 930 -477 -570 -350 150 100 60 60 110
Algeria -30 -30 -10 -20 -10 -30 -40 -40 -40 -40 -30
Equador 0 30 0 0 40 0 0 10 10 0 0
Venezuela -140 -30 0 11 -40 -70 -40 -50 50 60 50
Total Crude Oil 30 730 1 390 -919 50 -310 400 300 240 250 340
NGLs 460 360 360 50 134 190 237 55 13 19 21
Total OPEC 490 1 090 1 750 -869 184 -120 637 355 253 269 361
Total World 1 560 1 270 2 330 471 2 594 1 120 127 845 953 829 841
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Appendix 8: BL Return Residuals 
 
Appendix 9: Transaction Costs 
 
The costs are given in percentages. 
Appendix 10: COP Posterior Correlation Matrix. 
 
 Appendix 11: Out of Sample Mean and CVaR properties 
 
 
 
STL DNO DETNOR PEN TGS PGS SPU SUBC AKER AKSO SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC
Posterior - Prior(% ) -0.288 -0.239 -0.010 1.193 -0.307 -0.378 -0.666 -0.588 0.155 -0.628 0.147 0.347 0.902 0.554 -0.045 -0.148 0.539 0.057 -0.171
Historic SIC EY BL COP
MV 0.41 0.23 0.73 0.28 -
CVaR 0.38 0.23 0.75 0.46 0.37
SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR SUBC AKER AKSO TGS PGS SPU STL DNO DETNOR PEN PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC
SDRL 1.00 0.28 0.23 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.56 0.39 0.20 0.46 0.25 0.17 0.41 0.23 0.47 0.27 0.46 0.44
FOE 1.00 -0.03 0.30 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.12
SONG 1.00 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.11
SEVDR 1.00 0.41 0.44 0.23 0.35 0.48 0.14 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.35
SUBC 1.00 0.51 0.34 0.60 0.53 0.24 0.49 0.22 0.12 0.26 0.43 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.38
AKER 1.00 0.37 0.65 0.46 0.20 0.53 0.30 0.29 0.41 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.47
AKSO 1.00 0.35 0.37 0.28 0.24 0.36 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.26
TGS 1.00 0.54 0.31 0.42 0.16 0.07 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.45
PGS 1.00 0.24 0.47 0.39 0.03 0.16 0.40 0.41 0.23 0.29 0.23
SPU 1.00 0.27 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.18 -0.10 0.17 0.00
STL 1.00 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.41 0.43 0.30 0.42 0.28
DNO 1.00 0.12 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.13 0.21 0.08
DETNOR 1.00 0.12 0.13 0.18 -0.11 0.16 0.00
PEN 1.00 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.35 0.22
PRS 1.00 0.23 0.38 0.38 0.14
SIOFF 1.00 0.37 0.46 0.34
SOFF 1.00 0.47 0.40
FAR 1.00 0.40
DESSC 1.00
STL DNO DETNOR PEN TGS PGS SPU SUBCAKER AKSO SDRL FOE SONG SEVDR PRS SIOFF SOFF FAR DESSC OSLENX OSEBX
Return (%) 2.66 -2.30 5.61 16.27 2.05 7.46 -2.19 2.92 5.45 7.74 2.86 -4.30 3.71 -12.61 0.70 -2.93 -4.64 9.92 -3.19 2.60 2.41
CVaR 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.21 1.86 0.26 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.54 0.39 0.31 0.12 0.11
